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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants in state court may properly remove civil actions to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.' However, before the
defendants remove the action, plaintiffs may have already attempted to
defeat diversity jurisdiction by having joined a local' or nondiverse 3
defendant who may have no real connection to the case.4 In this situation,

1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (2005). There are strict limitations on removaljurisdiction. Also,
the removal statutes themselves are strictly construed. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (noting that congressional enactments subsequent to the JudiciaryAct
of 1887, which indicate an intent to restrict removal jurisdiction, imply that removal statutes are
to be strictly construed).
2. If a plaintiff sues a local defendant, the action cannot be removed, even if complete
diversity exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2005).
3. For purposes of this Article and for brevity's sake, I collapse the term "local defendant"
into the more comprehensive term "nondiverse defendant," even though a local defendant is not
necessarily a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff. Courts use other terms to describe the same
general phenomenon: The type of defendant who can defeat diversityjurisdiction ifnot fraudulently
joined. These terms would include "in-state" and "resident" defendants. See, e.g., McKee v. Kan.
City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2004) (utilizing the term "resident defendant" to
indicate the type of defendant who defeats diversity jurisdiction, assuming no fraudulent joinder
(quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)); Green v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that, to prove fraudulent joinder, "[tihe
removing party must prove that there is absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to
establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court, or that there has been
outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleadings ofjurisdictional facts") (emphasis added).
4. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914) (noting that a
defendant's "right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant
having no real connection with the controversy"); infra text accompanying notes 59-66. Cockrell
is probably the most significant U.S. Supreme Court case on the issue of fraudulent joinder.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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assuming the amount-in-controversy requirement is met, the diverse
defendants may remove the action to federal district court, arguing both
that complete diversity is present and that the plaintiffs have fraudulently
joined the nondiverse defendants.'
At this stage, the plaintiff may file a motion to remand the action back
to state court to avoid litigating the matter in the federal forum, a forum
often less sympathetic to plaintiffs than the state courts in which they
originally filed their complaints.' Whether the action will remain in federal
court typically hinges on one issue: whether the plaintiff has a possibility
of recovery against the nondiverse defendant under state law.7 On this
issue, the defendant bears the burden of proof.8 If the removing defendant
shows that there is no such possibility of recovery, the action remains in
federal court because the district court need not consider the fraudulently
joined defendant in determining diversity;9 if not, the action is remanded
to state court.
Answering this one question, however, has proved difficult and timeconsuming for many federal courts, l° even though the issue is essentially
5. See, e.g., McKee, 358 F.3d at 333 ("Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity
between the parties, however, such diversity cannot be destroyed by a plaintiff fraudulentlyjoining
a non-diverse defendant.").
6. Plaintiffs are at a special disadvantage when their cases are removed from state to federal
court. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really RevealAnything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 581
(1998) ("Plaintiffs' win rates in removed cases are very low, compared to cases brought originally
in federal court and to state cases. For example, our data reveal that the win rate in original
diversity cases is 71%, but in removed diversity cases it is only 34%."). Win rates for plaintiffs in
removed cases are generally lower at least in part due to defendants' increased access to summary
judgment in the federal forum. Then, too, the slower pacing of federal cases tends to favor
defendants over plaintiffs.
7. See, e.g., Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993) ("In order
to establish that a nondiverse defendant has been fraudulently joined, the removing party must
establish either: 'That there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of
action against the in-state defendant in state court; or (t]hat there has been outright fraud in the
plaintiff's pleading ofjurisdictional facts."') (quoting B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545,
549 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981)).
8. See, e.g., id. at 232. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing the basis for federal jurisdiction. Also note that all ambiguities in state law, and all
contested issues of fact, are decided in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 232-33. These standards detail
precisely how extreme the defendant's burden is.
9. See, e.g., Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (clarifying that the
fraudulent joinder doctrine "effectively permits a district court to disregard, for jurisdictional
purposes, the citizenship ofcertain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over a case, dismiss
the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain jurisdiction").
10. See, e.g., Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2003) ("While
fraudulent joinder-the filing of a frivolous or otherwise illegitimate claim against a non-diverse
defendant solely to prevent removal-is rather easily defined, it is much more difficultly applied.
'Neither our
circuit nor other circuits have been clear in
Circuit
recently noted,
As the Fifth
Published
by UF
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a threshold jurisdictional question." The trouble is understandable,
however, considering the circumstances. The fraudulent joinder doctrine
is inherently complex, 2 and this complexity is reflected and exacerbated
in federal circuits, which have split over a number of the important issues
in defining and applying the doctrine. 3
For purposes of clarifying the doctrine, this Article surveys the case
law in which federal appellate courts apply the doctrine, noting the key
aspects that engender disagreement among federal judges. 4 By addressing
such points of divergence, the Article also advances a normative claim that
the fraudulent joinder analysis should be more limited than some of the
leading jurisdictions maintain.' 5 Finally, the Article proposes a better
model of fraudulent joinder by
drawing on the diverse experience of the
16
federal courts on this matter.
Fraudulent joinder's inherent complexity may be seen in several
doctrinal nuances that risk obscuring fundamental principles. For instance,

describing the fraudulent joinder standard."') (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.
2003)).
Of course, such difficulty is borne to an overwhelming extent by the federal district courts. See
Blanchard v. State Farm Lloyds, 206 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting "the difficulty
in applying the standard for fraudulentjoinder"); Davis v. Prentiss Props. Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112,
1113 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Though many courts have discussed the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, it
is difficult to precisely identify the standard under which a court should consider the issue.").
Significantly, both of these district courts are situated within two jurisdictions, the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, that utilize complex versions of the doctrine, particularly the Fifth. See infra Part III.
11. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (stating that an
approach under which a federal court proceeds to dispose of the merits of claims before establishing
that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action "carries the courts beyond the bounds
of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers. This
conclusion should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long and venerable line of our cases.
'Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing
the fact and dismissing the cause."') (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869)); see
also Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422,425 (4th Cir. 1999) (fiaming the fraudulentjoinder
issue as a "threshold" and jurisdictional one).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part III. A circuit split has been articulated once before, but not recently. See
James F. Archibald III, Note, Reintroducing "Fraud"to the Doctrine of FraudulentJoinder,78
VA. L. REv. 1377, 1378-79 (1992) (noting a circuit split over the scope of inquiry in the fraudulent
joinder context). This note focuses on only one issue of fraudulent joinder on which the circuits are
split: the scope of inquiry that the district courts undertake when deciding the fraudulent joinder
question. However, a comprehensive survey yields three issues on which the circuits disagree: (1)
scope of inquiry; (2) interpreting the "no possibility" standard; and (3) whether the fraudulent
joinder doctrine is imagined as a 12(b)(6)-like question or as a narrowly jurisdictional one. See
infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.A-C.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.F.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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one of the basic principles of the fraudulent joinder doctrine is that the
removing defendants bear the burden of showing that the plaintiff has no
possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant, 7 and that burden
is heavy.' 8 However, defendants can subtly, but improperly, lessen the
burden, or even shift the burden back to the plaintiffs, through a
combination of argument and affidavits submitted in either the notice of
removal or the response to the plaintiffs motion to remand. These
arguments and affidavits might blur the line between jurisdictional facts
and facts relating to the merits of the plaintiffs claims against the
nondiverse defendant; and the court may not notice such impropriety,
producing a decision in which the court has improperly "pre-tried" the
plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant. 9
Furthermore, the federal circuits are split as to significant, and even
fundamental, ways of stating and applying the doctrine. The circuits split
on the following three issues: (1) scope of inquiry;2" (2) how the standard
"no possibility of recovery" is defined; 2' and, most importantly, (3)

17. See, e.g., Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904,907 (6th Cir. 1999)
(noting that "[t]he defendant that removes a case from state court bears the burden of establishing
federal subject-matter jurisdiction").
18. See, e.g., Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464, 466 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that the
removing defendant did not satisfy his "heavy burden" to establish fraudulent joinder).
19. See infra Part II.B.2.
20. See infra Part III.A. The scope of inquiry on the fraudulent joinder question varies. First,
there is the rare court that restricts itself to examining only the plaintiff's complaint at the time of
removal and nothing else, not even the defendant's affidavits. See Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 934 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. I11.1996) (finding fraudulent joinder purely on the basis of
apparent defects in the plaintiff's complaint and not considering any extrinsic evidence). Second,
there is the court that permits, but limits, examination of extrinsic evidence. See Boyer v. Snap-on
Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (permitting a limited look beyond the pleadings but
only tojurisdictional facts) (citing Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879 (10th
Cir. 1967)). Finally, there is the court that encourages and nearly compels examination of extrinsic
evidence. See Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458,462 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[p]laintiffs
could not rest upon mere allegations in their pleadings. Rather, the court could pierce the
pleadings").
21. See infra Part III.B. This standard is defined several different ways, although there are
two leading views. First, and more common, the "no possibility" standard is defined as whether the
plaintiff has "arguably a reasonable basis" on which to recover against the nondiverse defendant
under state law. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,
312 (5th Cir. 2002) ('If there is 'arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might
impose liability on the facts involved,' then there is no fraudulent joinder."') (quoting Badon v.
RJR Nabisco Inc., 236 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Jemigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989
F.2d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 1993))). Otherwise, the "no possibility" standard is defined as "absolutely
no possibility" of recovery against the nondiverse defendants. See Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181
F.3d 694,699 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that, to establish fraudulentjoinder, the removing defendant
must establish that "there is absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a
cause of action against the nondiverse defendant in state court").
standards-even in the same opinion. A panel
In thebyFifth
Circuit,
panels haveRepository,
deployed both
Published
UF Law
Scholarship
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whether the fraudulent joinder inquiry is analogized to a narrow
jurisdictional inquiry," or to a wider inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).2 3 Such doctrinal confusion and difference are grounds
for clarifying fraudulent joinder.
Clarifying fraudulentjoinder is best achieved by surveying the case law
in which the doctrine is defined and applied. This survey and clarification
of fraudulent joinder then may be measured against normative policy
principles to determine the best fraudulentjoinder doctrine, one that is less
complex and easier to apply than that which currently holds in many
jurisdictions, especially because a complex fraudulent joinder doctrine
risks violating the strong federal policies undergirding the doctrine.
At base, this means not forgetting that fraudulent joinder analysis is
essentially an issue of subject matter jurisdiction and should not relate to
the merits of the plaintiff's claims. It also means respecting the separation
of powers, particularly between the federal courts and Congress, when
considering the removal statutes-strong congressional policies to be
strictly construed 24 that limit federal jurisdiction and favor remand. 25 It
means that the principle of notice pleading, one of the touchstones of the

recently held that the two definitions are functionally the same and that the "reasonable basis"
standard was a better articulation of the common standard than the "absolutely no possibility"
language. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir. 2003). Arguably, this is sleight of
hand, but this Article takes the position that further annotation of the "no possibility" standard is
unnecessary, given of the defendant's heavy burden to prove fraudulent joinder and the more
pressing need to articulate that standard unadorned. See infra Part IV.F.
22. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the
fraudulent joinder inquiry is more properly analogized to an analysis under a narrower standard
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) regulating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matterjurisdiction rather than the "more searching" standard ofthe Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim).
23. See infraPart III.C; see also FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b)(6) ("failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted"); Travis, 326 F.3d at 648 (explaining that "[o]ur cases have ... noted the
similarity of the test for fraudulent joinder and the test for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion alleging failure
to state a claim").
24. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107 (1941) (noting that
then-recent amendments to the removal statutes were intended to limit federal jurisdiction); Cook
v. Wikler, 320 F.3d 431,436 (3d Cir. 2003) ("' [I]t is the majority view in this Circuit and the view
of the leading commentators that the removal statutes are to be strictly construed with any doubts
as to the propriety of removal being resolved in favor of remand."') (quoting unpublished district
court opinion). But see Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 488 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the basis
for the principle that the removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal has never
been adequately explained); Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L.
REv. 609, 630 (2004) (arguing that strictly construing the removal statutes was founded not on
congressional action through the Judiciary Act of 1887 but on a false perception by the courts of
congressional antagonism towards removal jurisdiction).
25. See Cook, 320 F.3d at 436.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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Federal Rules,26 should be respected, as federal courts should not plumb
the merits of plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse defendants before much,
if any, discovery has occurred.2 7 It means respecting federalism because,
if fraudulent joinder is misunderstood and misapplied, federal courts
improperly retain jurisdiction over matters that should be left to the wider
jurisdiction of the state courts,28 as Articles Ill and VI of the Constitution
imply.29 Finally, it means that extensive judicial resources should not be
allocated to discrete questions of subject matter jurisdiction.3"
More specifically, I propose limiting fraudulent joinder by resolving
the circuit split on the topic along the three areas of dispute, favoring a
limited scope of inquiry for a doctrine that neither fusses over the precise
definition of the plaintiffs possibility of recovery nor forgets the
essentially jurisdictional question before the court.
Part H of this Article consists of two elements: (1) a brief history of the
fraudulent joinder doctrine through pronouncements from the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts; and (2) a closer look at the doctrine's
inherent complexity." Then, Part III presents an account of the circuit split
on the doctrine structured by the issues on which the circuits disagree: (1)
scope of inquiry; (2) applying the "no possibility" standard; and (3)
whether the fraudulent joinder inquiry is closer to a jurisdictional or a
12(b)(6) inquiry. 2
Part IV of this Article analyzes both the doctrine's complexity and its
history of definition and application to propose the best approach to
fraudulent joinder, which limits its application on the basis of four
26. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829, 832 (W.D. Pa.
1955) ("There is something to be said for the argument that facts should be specifically pleaded so
as to facilitate the disposition of cases on pleadings. The principal obstacle to the argument lies in
the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rejected the theory of fact pleading and adopted
the theory of notice pleading."); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,45 ARZ.
L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) ("If any rule in federal civil procedure deserves the label 'blackletter,' it
is notice pleading.").
27. See Fairman, supra note 26, at 993 (stating that if greater detail is required of the
plaintiff's complaint, then discovery, and not heightened pleading, is the appropriate remedy).
28. See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 8, at 35 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (pointing out that
when a federal court does not remand a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, the
refusal to remand is "not simply wrong" but rather amounts to an "unconstitutional invasion").
29. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that the lower federal courts are creatures of
Congress); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that "[j]udges in every State shall be bound" by
federal law).
30. See Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458,464 n. 13 (1980) (noting that"' [j]urisdiction
should be as self-regulated as breathing; ... litigation over whether the case is in the right court is
essentially a waste of time and resources') (quoting David Currie, The FederalCourts and the
American Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 1 (1968)).
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
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arguments: (1) a separation of powers argument derived from the removal
statutes;33 (2) an argument deploying the liberal notice pleading standards
animating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 34 (3) a federalism
argument based on the federal-state divide as articulated in Articles UI and
VI of the Constitution; 35 and (4) a judicial economy argument that treats
fraudulent joinder as a question merely of subject matter jurisdiction
capable of swift, inexpensive resolution.36 Finally, Part IV proposes the
best fraudulent joinder doctrine in light of these policy concerns by
indicating how the circuit split should be resolved.37 Part V concludes the
discussion.
II.

HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF FRAUDULENT JOINDER

A. Pronouncementsfrom the Supreme Court andLower
FederalCourts
Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have created and
developed the fraudulent joinder doctrine. Several Supreme Court cases
decided in the early twentieth century laid the groundwork for today's
fraudulent joinder doctrine, and to this extent, the cases are helpful
examinations of the relation between removal and diversity jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the legal climate then was different from today, as these
cases predate Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins,38 predate the 1938 adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 and are preoccupied with one
question that no longer faces federal courts today because of a 1948
revision of the Judicial Code: whether the plaintiff s claims against diverse
and nondiverse parties are "separable," 4 even if those claims are related.4

33. See infra Part IV.B.
34. See infra Part IV.C.
35. See infra Part IV.D.
36. See infra Part IV.E.
37. See infra Part IV.F.
38. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts must apply state law, not federal
common law, in diversity cases). For pre-Erie cases, the fraudulent joinder issue had particular
relevance because the federal courts might differ greatly from the state courts in ascertaining and
applying substantive law, creating considerable incentive for litigants to engage in disfavored forum
shopping.
39. The cases that pre-date the Federal Rules indicate the Court's need to test pleadings more
severely than a federal court would today, thus reducing the relevance of these cases for the
fraudulent joinder issue currently. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring only notice pleadings in
federal court).
40. Before the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, a plaintiff's claims against a nondiverse
defendant could be removed if deemed separable. See Paxton v. Weaver, 553 F.2d 936, 938 (5th
Cir. 1977). The revision cut back on removal jurisdiction by making removable only those claims
the plaintiff brought against a nondiverse defendant that were unrelated to the action brought 8
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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However, long before the Supreme Court decided a string of cases
involving fraudulent joinder questions in the early twentieth century, the
Court had determined that the burden of proof to prove fraudulent joinder
rested on the defendant's shoulders.42 This determination was consistent
with principles that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that
the party seeking to litigate a matter in the federal forum should bear the
burden of showing federal jurisdiction."3
The Supreme Court first addressed the matter of fraudulent joinder
substantively in two cases, Alabama Great Southern Railway Co. v.
Thompson" and Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co. 45 Both
cases indicate many of the central issues of the fraudulent joinder doctrine
that remain relevant today, such as the level of deference to the plaintiff's
complaint that is appropriate and whether the district court may look
beyond the plaintiff's complaint in determining whether federal
jurisdiction is present.
Markedly at play in the Alabama railroad case is the principle that
plaintiffs may elect their own strategies in bringing suit, which may have
the effect of defeating both diversity jurisdiction and otherwise proper
removal by defendants. In Alabama, one of the rail company's trains had
killed the plaintiff, a pedestrian.' The administrator of the plaintiffs estate
sued both the diverse railroad company and the nondiverse train engineer
and conductor in a joint cause of action.47 The rail company removed the
action, arguing that the plaintiffs claims against the rail company were
separable from the plaintiffs claims against the engineer and conductor,
thereby making the rail company's removal proper because, according to
the rail company, complete diversity was then present. 4' The district court

against a diverse defendant. Id.
41. There is, however, one slight exception to this timetable. One case, Pullman Co. v.
Jenkins, was argued and decided on the cusp of 1938 and 1939.305 U.S. 534 (1939). However, this
case relates to one of the narrower issues in fraudulent joinder jurisprudence: whether post-removal
amendments to the plaintiff's complaint should be considered in deciding the fraudulent joinder
issue. Id. at 537.
42. See, e.g., Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421,425 (1887) (stating that "[a]s [the defendant]
was the actor in the removal proceeding, it rested on her to make out the jurisdiction of the circuit
court").
43. See, e.g., Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039, 1052 (5th Cir. 1982),
(noting that "the party invoking the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of 'alleg(ing) with
sufficient particularity the facts creating jurisdiction' and of 'support(ing) the allegation' if
challenged") (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,287 n. 10 (1938)).
44. 200 U.S. 206 (1906).
45. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
46. Ala. Great S., 200 U.S. at 211.
47. Id.
48. Id. Until the Judiciary Act of 1948, controversies deemed "separable" from the
underlying cause of action were deemed removable. See supra note 40.
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denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, and after a trial on the merits, the
plaintiff appealed the jurisdictional issue to the Sixth Circuit, which
subsequently certified the question to the U.S. Supreme Court.49
Holding that "the plaintiff may elect his own method of attack,"5
which may have the effect of precluding removal, the Court stressed its
need, in the absence of any actual fraud on the plaintiffs part, to rely on
the complaint as it existed at the time of removal, 5' regardless of whether
the outcome was one that would be sufficient for federal jurisdiction. Such
judicial restraint would prevent the Court from second-guessing the
plaintiffs pleadings under these circumstances because, even if the
plaintiff "misconceive[s] his cause of action," misconception does not
make a joint claim separable.52 In so holding, the Court also indicated the
importance of the removal statutes in deciding the question, despite what
the applicable law may determine as to whether the plaintiff could
legitimately pursue such a joint cause of action, and despite the forumshopping that might occur. For the Court, the central question on
fraudulent joinder was simply, "[w]hat controversies has Congress made
removable in the act under consideration?"53 The Court's answer to this
question indicated that the district court erred in not remanding the case. 4
In Wecker, however, the Court did not practice the same judicial
restraint, indicating that it was acceptable for a district court to look
beyond the plaintiffs complaint to determine if there was fraudulent
joinder.55 The plaintiff, an employee of the enameling and stamping
company, was injured on the job and sued his diverse employer and his
nondiverse supervisor jointly, as in the Alabama railroad case.56 Finding
fraudulent joinder of the nondiverse defendant, the Court relied heavily on
an affidavit by the employer averring that the supervisor's duties were
merely clerical and thus that the supervisor could not be held liable for the
plaintiff's injuries. 7 As such, the Court found that federal subject matter
jurisdiction was present and removal was proper, despite the plaintiffs
filing a counter-affidavit.5"

49. Ala. GreatS., 200 U.S. at 212.
50. Id. at 216.
51. Id. at 215-16.
52. Id. at 218.
53. Id. at 219. This question remains probably the simplest and most correct way of stating
the question of fraudulent joinder, which relates to interpretation of the removal statutes. See infra
Part IV.B for a discussion of the central role of the removal statutes in the fraudulent joinder
analysis.
54. Ala. Great S., 200 U.S. at 219.
55. Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 184 (1907).
56. Id. at 178.
57. Id. at 184.
58. Id. at 185. Because of the liberal notice pleading standards animating the Federal Rules,
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In probably the most significant Supreme Court case on the issue of
fraudulent joinder, Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell, the
plaintiff sued the diverse rail company and nondiverse employees of the
rail company, as in the Alabama railroad case.59 This Court formulated the
doctrine, in words often quoted in federal court opinions, that a
defendant's "right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder
60
of a resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy.,
Further, the Court noted that the key issue in deciding the fraudulent
joinder question was not the plaintiff's mental state in bringing the action
against the nondiverse defendants-whether the plaintiff had a fraudulent
motive in joining the nondiverse defendants-but rather the objective

this case might be decided differently today. Under today's Rules, discovery, and not the pleadings
and accompanying affidavits, should be used to determine out whether the plaintiff's supervisor
could be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries. See Fairman, supra note 26, at 993 (arguing that
discovery, and not heightened pleading, "is the answer" for pleadings lacking detail).
However, in the leading Fifth Circuit, the case would likely be decided exactly the same way
because of the great extent to which district courts within the Fifth Circuit are empowered to
"pierce the pleadings" and to examine and rely upon affidavits such as the one at issue in Wecker.
See infra Part II.B.4. Indeed, Wecker remains vibrant law precisely to the extent that the relevant
jurisdiction permits its district courts to pierce the pleadings. However, the defendant's affidavit
here probably relates in part to the merits of the plaintiff's claims, not to jurisdiction only. The
merits of the plaintiff's claim should not enter into the fraudulent joinder analysis at all. If there is
fraudulent joinder, the issue should be focused on an analysis of the purelyjurisdictional facts. See
infra Part IV.F.1.
59. 232 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1914); see also Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153)); Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir.
2004) (also citing Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153).
60. Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 152. This language is often misattributed to Wilson v. RepublicIron
& Steel Co., which relies upon and quotes Cockrell's first enunciation of the phrase "no real
connection with the controversy." 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); see also Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp.
906,913-14 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (citing Wilson for the proposition that fraudulent joinder occurs when
a plaintiff joins a party against whom there is "no real cause of action"). See also infra text
accompanying notes 67-70 for discussion of Wilson.
This misattribution partly forms the basis for some of the dissents in the Fifth Circuit en banc
decision on fraudulent joinder. See Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 577(Jolly, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Cockrell decision, upon which the majority relied in its holding, was a "seldom cited 1914 factspecific case"). The dissenters misstate the importance of Cockrell, which, if seldom cited, is by
mistake. The facts of Cockrell are emblematic, ifnot paradigmatic, of most fraudulentjoinder facts.
The language "no real connection with the controversy" plays a central role in the Second
Circuit's fraudulentjoinder standard. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196,207 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("[A] plaintiff may not defeat a federal court's diversity jurisdiction and a defendant's
right of removal by merely joining as defendants parties with no real connection with the
controversy.") (quoting Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1998)).
See infra Part III.B for further discussion of this Second Circuit standard.
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question of whether the plaintiff had a "reasonable basis"'" for recovery
against those defendants.62
Finally, and most importantly for the fraudulentjoinder doctrine today,
Cockrell distinguishes between an inquiry into the jurisdictional question
and an inquiry into the merits of the plaintiffs claims-the central
controversy in fraudulent joinder. In Cockrell,the removing defendant, the
rail company, simply argued that the plaintiff could not recover against the
engineer and fireman of the railroad because the claim, negligence, was
' However, the
"falsely or recklessly made and could not be proved."63
Court noted that, under the principle of respondeat superior, the alleged
liability of the rail company was founded upon the alleged liability of the
engineer and fireman.' As a result, "the showing manifestly went to the
' This meant
merits of the action as an entirety, and not to the joinder."65
that there was no fraudulent joinder, and hence no federal jurisdiction,
because the defendant had challenged the validity of the plaintiff's claims
generally, which was a substantive matter for the state court to address.6 6
By contrast, the most cited of Supreme Court cases on the issue of
fraudulent joinder, Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 67 which occurred
several years later, actually contains little more that is significant for
statements and applications of the doctrine today. The plaintiff was injured
on the job and brought an action against his diverse employer and a
nondiverse co-employee, as in Wecker. 68 Finding federal jurisdiction, the
Court stressed that the fraudulent joinder inquiry was a "jurisdictional
61. Cockrell,232 U.S. at 153. This is the first instance of the "reasonable basis" articulation
of the fraudulent joinder standard. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of this standard as
contrasted with the "absolutely no possibility" articulation.
62. Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153 ("Putting out of view, as must be done, the epithets and mere
legal conclusions in the petition for removal, it may have disclosed an absence of good faith on the
part of the plaintiff in bringing the action at all, but it did not show a fraudulent joinder of the
engineer and fireman."). In this sense, "fraudulent joinder" is a misnomer because any bad faith on
the part of the plaintiff in bringing the action against the nondiverse defendant is immaterial in
determining whether federal jurisdiction lies-that is, unless the removing defendant can show the
plaintiff's fraudulent recitation of the jurisdictional facts, a nearly impossible task. See id.
Correspondingly, many federal courts often state, at the outset of their discussion of the fraudulent
joinder issue, that "fraudulent joinder" is a "term of art." See, e.g., McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp.,
811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Fraudulent joinder is a term of art. If the plaintiff fails to
state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the
settled rules of the state, the joinder of the resident defendant is fraudulent.").
63. Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. This was the specific issue before the Fifth Circuit in the recent en banc Smallwood case.
See Smallwood v. 111. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 2004).
67. 257 U.S. 92 (1921). As of January 5,2005, the case had been cited well over 1500 times
by courts and secondary sources.
68. Id. at 93, 94.
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question" only.69 The removing defendant met its burden to show
fraudulent joinder, and the plaintiff did not contest the defendant's
arguments or evidence.7"
Finally, in Pullmanv. Jenkins,"'the Court established that post-removal
amendments to the plaintiffs complaint would not affect the fraudulent
joiner analysis, thus preventing plaintiffs from unfairly manipulating the
removal-and-remand process by continually amending their complaints
after removal to defeat diversity jurisdiction.72 Rather, to prevent such
manipulation, the fraudulent joinder inquiry necessitated examining the
plaintiff's complaint at the time of removal, neither before nor after."
However, the Supreme Court did not develop certain important aspects
of the doctrine. First, it was mainly the lower federal courts that developed
the principle that the burden of establishing fraudulent joinder, borne by
the defendant, is a heavy burden.74 The lower federal courts also developed
the practical consequences of this heavy burden, for what truly makes the
defendant's burden heavy is that all ambiguous questions of state law, and
69. Id. at 95, 96 ("The jurisdictional question is all that is before us.").
70. Id. at 98. The Court likely stressed too much the plaintiff's failure to contest the
defendant's campaign for federal jurisdiction. Regardless of the plaintiff's resistance to the
defendant's removal, the defendant must satisfy the court that the plaintiff has fraudulently joined
a nondiverse defendant before federal jurisdiction is proper. See supra note 26. And, of course,
however much a plaintiff's inaction on the fraudulent joinder question might look like a waiver to
a federal court, federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established simply via waiver.
Unlike the way in which the fraudulent joinder inquiry proceeds in federal courts today,
however, the Court noted and failed to object to the fact that the district court had held a "hearing"
to decide the jurisdictional question. Id. at 95. Even the jurisdictions that permit the widest scope
of inquiry on this issue today, including the Fifth Circuit, refuse to allow the district courts to use
hearings to decide the matter. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. Unit
A Dec. 1981).
71. 305 U.S. 534 (1939).
72. Id. at 541. If plaintiffs could amend their petitions after removal, they could create
unreasonable delays in determining which court, state or federal, should hear the case, simply by
continually joining nondiverse defendants. However, after removal and after the courts have
decided the fraudulentjoinder question, the plaintiff may attempt joinder of claims and parties, and
the court has discretion under 1447(e) to permit such joinder. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2005).
On the other side, however, in most jurisdictions defendants enjoy the advantage of delay by
removing actions in state court that are likely to be remanded subsequent to removal. See, e.g.,
Strange v. Crum Constr. LLC, No. IPO1-0789-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1160952, at *4 (S.D. Ind.Aug. 28,
2001) (stating that the defendant's "removal has won it nearly a three-month delay in this litigation,
but it was not entitled to that delay"). In theory, defendants run the risk of having fees and costs
assessed against them for improvident removal under section 1447(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). But
since courts are reluctant to award fees and costs-an award that can be appealed and can thus
create further delay--this risk is often not a practical concern.
73. Pullman, 305 U.S. at 540-41.
74. See, e.g., Davis v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 47 F.2d 48, 50-51 (8th Cir. 1931) ("The
burden of proof is upon the removing defendant, and the fraud of the plaintiff must be proven by
evidence that is clear and convincing.").
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all contested issues of fact, are resolved in the plaintiffs favor upon the
district court's deciding a motion to remand. 5
The justification for this rule appears to be, among other things, to
respect the plaintiffs original choice of forum.76 More specifically,
regarding factual disputes, the court's role at this stage in the litigation is
merely to determine jurisdiction and not to litigate the merits of the case.7 7
Regarding ambiguities in the law, the court is not required to predict how
the state's highest court would state and apply the law to the facts because,
again, fraudulent joinder is a jurisdictional issue.78 Erie analysis is not
proper. To do otherwise, when the state has not produced clearly settled
law that would apply to the facts, would be to trample on state sovereignty.
These Supreme Court cases indicate a schema for contemporary fact
patterns to which the fraudulentjoinder doctrine might apply, although the
cases are inapplicable to the extent that the issue of whether a controversy
is "separable" plays a role in the holding because of subsequent changes
in the Judicial Code. The cases indicate that the plaintiffs are often fond
of bringing an action against a diverse entity and nondiverse agents of that
entity. Indeed, this is the most 7common
fact pattern to which the fraudulent
9
joinder doctrine might apply.
B. FraudulentJoinder'sInherent Complexity
A full restatement of the fraudulent joinder test, attending to every
doctrinal nuance, is more complex and lengthy than one might think,
considering that the fraudulent joinder question is jurisdictional. 80 The
following summation of the doctrine separates the roles of the plaintiffs,
75. See, e.g., Boyle v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 42 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1930) (noting
that "rights of the plaintiff are protected by the rule that the burden of proving the fraudulent
allegations is on defendant, and, by the corollary thereto, that all situations of doubt are to be
resolved in favor of the plaintiff").
76. See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., Ltd., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (permitting plaintiffs to sue
not all potential tort feasors under Rule 19(b)). See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of how Rule 19
supports a limited fraudulent joinder doctrine.
77. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Albert v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2004)
(determining that fraudulent joinder analysis is a "jurisdictional inquiry").
79. Another common fraudulentjoinder fact pattern includes a products liability action, often
for an unreasonably dangerous pharmaceutical or vaccine. In such cases, the plaintiff sues the
designing and manufacturing corporations, usually with diverse citizenship from the plaintiff, and
the prescribing physician and/or pharmacy, usually nondiverse.
80. Hypothetically, the fraudulent joinder doctrine is a means by which federal courts may
attempt to filter out frivolous claims, avoiding "voluminous discovery," and sympathizing with
"victimized defendants." See Fairman, supranote 26, at 1065 (noting that federal courts routinely
apply higher pleading requirements than notice pleading because of "similar resonating themes of
meritless cases, voluminous discovery, victimized defendants," themes that "are easy to glean from
judicial opinions").
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defendants, and court. The remainder of this subsection singles out certain
areas of doctrinal complexity for discussion.
1. The Respective Roles of the Parties and of the Court
a. The Defendant's Role
The defendant's role in the fraudulent joinder context begins with the
decision to remove on the basis of fraudulent joinder. Under the typical
removal guidelines, the removing defendants must comply with thirty-day
and one-year deadlines, 8 ' must secure consent to remove among all
defendants (except the defendant allegedlyjoined fraudulently),82 and must
file a notice of removal in the state and federal court,8 3 among other
requirements.84 Once the removing defendant has invoked the doctrine as
part of the basis for removal, and once the plaintiff has filed a motion to
remand, the removing defendant bears the burden of proof to show
fraudulent joinder.8 5
The removing defendant may show fraudulent joinder in one of two
ways, either by (1) showing that the plaintiff has falsely or fraudulently
pled the jurisdictional facts of the citizenship of the parties in the
complaint, often a nearly impossible task, or (2) showing that the plaintiff
has no possibility of recovery against the diverse or nondiverse defendants
in state court.86 In nearly every case, the removing defendant is called upon
to show the latter, that the plaintiff has no possibility of recovery against
the nondiverse defendant or defendants. Courts differ as to how to define
the phrase "no possibility of recovery., 87 In fact, there is a spectrum of
opinion. At one extreme of the spectrum, some courts hold that the motion
8
to remand will be granted if the plaintiff has a mere "glimmer of hope"
of recovery against the nondiverse defendant. At the other extreme, some
courts hold that the motion to remand will be granted only if the plaintiff

81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2005).
82. See, e.g., Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209,213 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating the
unanimity rule and the exception for the following defendants: those allegedly joined fraudulently,
nominal defendants, and defendants who have yet to be served).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
84. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the numerous removal requirements.
85. See, e.g., Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992) ("An out-of-state
defendant who wants to remove must bear a heavy burden to establish fraudulent joinder.").
86. See, e.g., McKee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 333, 334 (5th Cir. 2004).
87. See infra Part III.B.
88. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that to
remand the case "there need be only a slight possibility of a right to relief. Once the court identifies
this glimmer of hope for the plaintiff, the jurisdictional inquiry ends") (citation omitted); see also
466 (4th Cir.2006
1999).
198 F.3d 457,Repository,
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has "arguably a reasonable basis"8 9 for recovery against the nondiverse
defendant.
The removing defendant bears a heavy burden to show fraudulent
joinder, and the burden is heavy in large part because issues of both law
and fact are to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." However, issues of
fact are to be resolved in favor of plaintiffs only if they are disputed. 9'
Likewise, issues of state law are to be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs
only if they are ambiguous. 92 Some courts even hold that the removing
defendants must satisfy a high "clear and convincing" standard to defeat
the motion to remand. 93 In nearly all jurisdictions, the defendant is free to
submit documentary material or "summaryjudgment-type" evidence, such
as affidavits, deposition transcripts, and official documents, to show
fraudulent joinder.94 Some courts restrict the type of documentation that
the defendant may submit.
If defendants lose on the motion to remand, they are left without a
remedy because the order cannot be appealed, pursuant to federal statute."
Even worse, if defendants lose on the motion to remand, the district court
is empowered by federal statute to award costs to the plaintiffs.96 However,
if the court awards costs to the97 plaintiffs, then the defendants are permitted
to appeal the award of costs.

89. See, e.g., Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644,647 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting
16 JAmES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE'S FEDERALPRACTICE § 107.14[2][c][iv][C] (3d ed. 2002)).
90. See Parnpillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998).
91. See, e.g., Johnson v. James Constr. Group, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657 (S.D. Miss.

2004).
92. Id. Some courts have gone as far as to hold that, if the district court must embark on a
detailed inspection of state law, then the defendant has not met its burden to show fraudulent
joinder. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 853 (3d Cir. 1992) ("A claim which can
be dismissed only after an intricate analysis of state law is not so wholly insubstantial and frivolous
that it may be disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.").
93. See, e.g., Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 461. However, courts have been less inclined to
deploy the "clear and convincing" standard over time, considering the relative popularity of the
standard of resolving disputed issues of fact and ambiguities in state law in favor of the plaintiff.
94. See, e.g., Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 462-63 (5th Cir. 2003) ("For
fraudulent joinder vel non, it is well established that the district court may 'pierce the pleadings'
and consider summary judgment-type evidence.").
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2005). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (permitting review of
remand decisions in class actions under certain circumstances).
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, outside of the Seventh Circuit, this result typically
does not occur because the award of costs, unlike the grant of the motion to remand, can be
reviewed by an appellate panel. In the Seventh Circuit, however, district courts are more inclined
to award costs. See, e.g., Valentine v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:03-CV-090-JDT-WGH, 2003 WL
23220758, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 4, 2003) (awarding costs and fees to plaintiffs when defendants
removed a cause of action in which plaintiff pleaded negligence against nondiverse defendant, and
noting that section 1447(c) is not a sanctions statute but rather a fee-shifting one).
97. This appeal can accomplish two things. First, it can delay remand even further. Second, 16
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b. The Plaintiffs Role
Upon removal, the plaintiff will likely file a motion to remand, which
will trigger the defendant's heavy burden to show fraudulent joinder.
Section 1447(c) provides that the plaintiff has thirty days after the notice
of removal is filed to file a motion to remand.98 However, if the defect
alleged as the basis for remand is one pertaining to subject matter
jurisdiction, there is no deadline and the court is entitled to remand sua
sponte "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction."99 The plaintiff is "master of [the]
complaint" and receives deference in its choice of forum.' 00 By contrast,
the removing defendant, as the party invoking the federal court's
jurisdiction, necessarily bears the burden of showing the basis for that
jurisdiction.'0 ' The plaintiff must also presumptively comply with the
dictates of any applicable state version of the federal Rule 11102 in
asserting claims against the nondiverse defendant or defendants.
Like the removing defendant, the plaintiff may submit supplementary
material; however, that material must be limited to elaborating on the
factual allegations and causes of action pled against the nondiverse
defendant in the complaint as it existed at the time of removal.0 3 Postremoval amendments to the complaint are ignored in deciding the
fraudulent joinder question,"' 4 and the court likewise will ignore

it can provide an end-around appeal of the district court's decision granting the motion to remand,
as the appellate court may take into account the district court's decision to remand in determining
whether the award of costs is appropriate. If defendants win on this appeal, it could mean that the
district court will later deny the motion to remand to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(permitting the federal courts to issue writs in aid of their jurisdiction).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
see also Darras v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D. Ill.
99. See id.;
1985) (remanding the removed case suaspontebased on facial deficiencies in the removal petition).
100. See Owens v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2003)
(adducing the policy that a plaintiff is the master of his complaint as a check on the defendant's
right to a federal forum).
101. Seeln re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136,150 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting
that "[d]efendants, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, carry the burden" of establishing that
federal jurisdiction is proper) (quoting In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 295
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring, in part, that attorneys certify that pleadings contain claims
that are not frivolous).
103. See, e.g., Conk v. Richards & O'Neil, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 964 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
(stating that the plaintiff is not prohibited from elaborating on the claims actually asserted in the
complaint at the time of removal to support the plaintiff's motion to remand).
104. However, under section 1447(e), the federal court has discretion to permit joinder of
claims or parties after removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2005). This rule may apply even after a
Fairness factors
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information the plaintiff submits that exceeds the scope of the plaintiffs
complaint at the time of removal.° 5
However, much of the plaintiff s role in the fraudulent joinder analysis
occurs before removal, at the pleadings stage. Plaintiffs who have drafted
their state court complaints with an eye toward how the federal district
courts will perceive them will succeed more often in the fraudulent joinder
context than those who do not, as the federal court may not pay much heed
to liberal notice pleading standards that might apply in the state court from
which the case was removed.' 06 If the complaint fails to state a cause of
action against the nondiverse defendant or defendants, the motion to
remand maybe denied, depending on the jurisdiction, even if the plaintiff
does have a possibility for recovery against the nondiverse defendant that
would defeat diversity and thus federal jurisdiction." 7 Plaintiffs who
contest any issues of fact and law that the removing defendant raises in the
notice of removal stand a better chance of seeing their motions to remand
granted, as those issues will be resolved in the plaintiffs' favor.'
c. The District Court's Role
In deciding the fraudulent joinder question, the court reviews (1) the
notice of removal, including any summary judgment-like evidence
submitted, (2) the motion to remand with any summary judgment-like

F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying a multifactor test).
105. Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182.
106. Under Erie and its progeny, federal courts are free to apply their own rules of procedure,
provided there is no conflict with those of the states. But even if there is such conflict, if a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure applies, then the federal rule will effectively preempt the contrary state rule
of procedure. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965) (stating that applying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity actions was neither unconstitutional nor violated the
requirements of the Rules Enabling Act).
However, anomalous results can occur, especially if the federal court is convinced that the
fraudulent joinder issue is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, in which case the court would
need to decide the jurisdictional question before the federal rules would apply. See Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). In this situation, and assuming that the
plaintiff's complaint could be challenged, plaintiffs should make the argument that, under the
relevant state rules of procedure, any defects in the complaint would not be defects under state law.
107. See, e.g., Smallwood v. 111. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568,573 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that,
in conducting the fraudulent joinder analysis, the court first looks to the plaintiff's complaint to see
if it states a claim against the nondiverse defendant, and opining that "there are cases, hopefully few
in number, in which a plaintiff has stated a claim, but has misstated or omitted discrete facts that
would determine the propriety ofjoinder"). But see Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457,464 (4th Cir.
1999) (stating that the fraudulent joinder analysis is less searching than that which would apply a
12(b)(6)-like approach to determine whether the plaintiff had stated a claim against the nondiverse
defendant).
108. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that "all
reasonable inferences from the record" are resolved in the plaintiff's favor).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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material that does not go beyond the allegations and theories pled in the
plaintiffs complaint as it existed at the time of removal, and (3) any
subsequent responses or replies. In reviewing this material, the court
typically does not follow precise rules. However, the court must
nevertheless separate the essentially jurisdictional question of fraudulent
joinder from the question of the merits of the plaintiffs case against the
nondiverse defendant. In short, the district court is prohibited from "pretry[ing]" the plaintiff's case against the nondiverse defendant. 09
' However,
at the same time, the district court must consider the merits of the
plaintiffs claims against the nondiverse defendants in a hypothetical
manner to determine whether the plaintiff has a possibility of recovery
against the nondiverse defendant. " 0
In doing so, the court may apply a standard to determine whether the
plaintiff has a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendants,
although that standard varies with the jurisdiction. Some courts apply a
narrow jurisdictional standard akin to that ofRule 12(b)(1),11 while others
apply a standard similar to the 12(b)(6) standard.' 12 Those courts that apply
the 12(b)(6)-like standard may still review extrinsic evidence, despite that
12(b)(6) does not permit a court to review such evidence. "3 Also, in those
courts that apply the 12(b)(6)-like standard to resolve the fraudulent
joinder question, the plaintiff may later see its claims dismissed against the
nondiverse defendant, despite that the plaintiff has survived the 12(b)(6)
fraudulent joinder inquiry, but not the standard 12(b)(6) inquiry." 4
109. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545,546 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (stating
that "district courts must not 'pre-try' substantive factual issues in order to answer the discrete
threshold question of whether the joinder of an in-state defendant is fraudulent").
110. See Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe federal court
must engage in an act of prediction: is there any reasonable possibility that a state court would rule
against the nondiverse defendant?").
111. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3rd Cir. 1992) (applying a standard
derived from Rule 12(b)(l) to fraudulent joinder analysis).
112. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 2003) (deriving a fraudulent joinder
standard from Rule 12(b)(6)).
113. If a defendant files a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and submits "matters outside the
pleading," then the motion will be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56
and "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such
a motion by Rule 56." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
114. Batoff, 977 F.2d at 852. This is yet another means by which the plaintiff may have an
easier time defeating removal, although it does delay further the disposition of the question. That
the 12(b)(6) standard has been incorporated into the fraudulent joinder standard is perhaps the
biggest cause for confusion in applying the doctrine, not least because many courts interpret the
12(b)(6) standard differently. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the
"LitigationExplosion," "LiabilityCrisis, "andEfficiency ClichesErodingOurDay in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1009-10 (2003) (stating that "[d]espite a rich
history ofjudges interpreting [the 12(b)(6)] language with great liberality, some courts adopted the
view that by
theUF
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Regardless of which standard is applied, the court must resolve all factual
disputes, and all ambiguities in state law, in favor of the plaintiff."5 If
there are any doubts in the analysis, then some courts hold that such doubts
should be resolved in favor of remand." 6
If the court grants the motion to remand, the order cannot be appealed,
not even through a mandamus action." 7 If the motion is denied, then the
order may be appealed after final judgment, and the district court may
proceed to dismiss the nondiverse defendants under Rule 21.118 The court
also has the option of awarding costs to the plaintiff if the motion to
remand is granted and the defendant removed unreasonably." 9 However,
the decision to award costs may be appealed, which can delay remand and
provide defendants with an indirect means of appellate review of the
ordinarily unreviewable district court decision to remand. This state of
affairs encourages district courts not to award costs. 2 °
2. The Burden of Proof
a. Easing and Shifting the Burden
Despite that the heavy burden to show fraudulent joinder is squarely on
the removing defendant's shoulders, the removing defendant is capable of
easing, or even shifting, its burden through specialized litigation tactics,
supposedly 'disfavored' character of the litigation or underlying substantive law, making some
cases more vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) than others").
115. See McKee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2004).
116. See, e.g., Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
"where the sufficiency ofthe complaint against the nondiverse defendant is questionable, 'the better
practice is for the federal court not to decide the doubtful question in connection with a motion to
remand but simply to remand the case and leave the question for the state courts to decide"')
(quoting Iowa Public Serv. Co. v. Medicine Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1977));
Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26,29 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that, when interpreting
the removal statutes, the statutes should be strictly construed "and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of remand").
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2005); Victor v. Grand Casino-Coushatta, 359 F.3d 782, 784
(5th Cir. 2004) (noting that appellate courts are precluded from reviewing remand orders issued
pursuant to section 1447(c), by appeal, mandamus, or otherwise).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately."); Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting,
Inc., 261 F.3d 196,207 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that district court dismissed fraudulentlyjoined party
under Rule 21).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (stating that "[ajn order remanding the case may require payment
ofjust costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal").
120. See generally Christopher R. McFadden, Removal, Remand andReimbursement Under
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), 87 MARQ. L. REV. 123 (2003) (arguing in favor of an increased awarding of
costs under section 1447(c)).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
20

Richardson: Clarifying and Limiting Fraudulent Joinder
CLARIFYING AND LIMITING FRAUDULENT JOINDER

particularly in jurisdictions like the Fifth Circuit, which permits a wide
scope of inquiry on the fraudulent joinder question."'2 The defendants may
flood the district court with summary judgment-like evidence that is
relevant to both the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the plaintiff's
claims against the nondiverse defendant. This tactic not only increases the
likelihood that the court will decide the fraudulent joinder issue in the
defendant's favor, but also increases the likelihood that the district court
will decide the issue at least in part on the merits. 122 The plaintiff, who
simply may have satisfied the notice pleading standards of the state where
the action was originally filed, without having included detailed factual
allegations in the complaint, may then suffer the federal district court's
skepticism as to the viability of the plaintiffs claims against the
nondiverse defendant, 23 even though the plaintiff
24 may have a possibility
of recovery against the nondiverse defendant.1
The plaintiff may then be required to rebut the defendant's arguments
and affidavits, which may relate to the merits of the plaintiffs claims
rather than to the court's jurisdiction, possibly before any substantive
discovery has occurred. The merits of the plaintiffs claims against the
nondiverse defendants, which could very well apply to the diverse
defendants as well, 125 would be litigated through the pleadings and very
limited factual inquiry, if any. 26 Even worse, the plaintiff's complaint may
be tested so severely under these circumstances that notice pleading
121. Recently, the Fifth Circuit has remarked in dicta that it may be backing off in its
commitment to a wide scope of inquiry in the fraudulent joinder context. See Smallwood v. I11.
Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We emphasize that any piercing of the
pleadings should not entail substantial hearings. Discovery by the parties should not be allowed
except on a tight judicial tether, sharply tailored to the question at hand, and only after a showing
of its necessity.").
122. This is the classic difficulty in fraudulent joinder analysis: separating jurisdictional facts
from those facts that relate to the merits of the plaintiffs claims against the nondiverse defendant.
See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545,548-49 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (pointing out
that "the trial court must be certain of its jurisdiction before embarking upon a safari in search of
a judgment on the merits").
123. Such skepticism may extend to the plaintiffs claims generally; this is, of course,
eminently desirable for removing defendants.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See infra Part III.C.I.
126. While generally disfavored, litigation through the pleadings is acceptable in special
circumstances, such as when one or more of the plaintiffs claims against the defendants are not
legally sufficient, which would subject the plaintiff to a defendant's successful motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (permitting a court to dismiss an action for
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). Another example would be if the
parties do not dispute the facts in the pleadings, which could occasion a motion from either side for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) ("After the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.").
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standards are completely abandoned,' and the plaintiff may not be
permitted even to elaborate on the factual basis of his claims against the
nondiverse defendants.' 28 This is a far cry from the ordinarily heavy
burden to show fraudulent joinder that the defendants bear, a burden that
has been likened to an exceedingly high "clear and convincing"
one court has termed "one of the heaviest burdens
standard,' 29 and that 130
known to civil law."'
b. Defendant's Burden to Show No Possibility, or Plaintiff's
Burden to State a Claim?
In jurisdictions that apply the 12(b)(6) standard as part of the fraudulent
joinder analysis, if the plaintiff has not stated a claim against the
nondiverse defendant, then the motion to remand will be denied. However,
the plaintiff might have a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse
defendant that would defeat federal jurisdiction, but may not have literally

127. See Fairman, supra note 26, at 988 (arguing that "[s]ometimes subtle, other times overt,
federal courts in every circuit impose non-Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention
of notice pleading doctrine").
128. See Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 934 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff's complaint alone serves as the basis for determining whether there is
fraudulent joinder and that plaintiff's additional "factual allegations will be ignored").
This result is an example of the extreme application of the generally sensible rule that, in the
context of fraudulent joinder, the plaintiff's complaint must be examined at the time of removal,
and that post-removal amendments to that complaint should not be considered by the district court
in determining the fraudulent joinder question. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537
(1939) (reversing remand ordered by court of appeals on basis of post-removal amendment to
complaint). Without this rule, plaintiffs could easily manipulate the fraudulent joinder analysis by
joining or dismissing parties.
However, refusing to permit the plaintiff the opportunity to elaborate on factual allegations,
while permitting the removing defendant to do so, is patently unfair, especially because the
plaintiff's complaint was not subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in state court. See
Conk v. Richards & O'Neil, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 961, 963 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (noting that "the
court may consider the plaintiff's factual assertions (whether in a brief, an affidavit, or in some
other form), that elaborate on the allegations of the complaint, so long as those factual assertions
are not inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint. That is, the plaintiff has at least as much
latitude in responding to such a claim of fraudulent joinder as he would have in responding to a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.").
129. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196,207 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "[in
order to show that naming a nondiverse defendant is a 'fraudulent joinder' effected to defeat
diversity, the defendant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, either that there has
been outright fraud committed in the plaintiff's pleadings, or that there is no possibility, based on
the pleadings, that the plaintiff can state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state
court") (emphasis added) (quoting Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir.
1998)).
130. Strange v. Crum Constr. LLC, No. IPO 1-0789-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1160952, at * I (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 28, 2001).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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stated a claim against the nondiverse defendant.'31 The problem arises out
of the perhaps inevitable confusion that occurs when the federal courts
utilize a 12(b)(6) standard to determine this jurisdictional question. Using
this standard imports the baggage of 12(b)(6) into the fraudulent joinder
context, a context that should be baggage-free. 132
Courts that apply the 12(b)(6) standard as a means of deciding the
fraudulent joinder question also reserve the right to examine extrinsic
evidence,133 which is barred under 12(b)(6). 134 Under the Federal Rules, if
a court decides a motion to dismiss while considering extrinsic evidence,
the motion transforms to one under Rule 56(b), 135 or a motion for summary
judgment. 36 An order granting a motion for summary judgment usually
has preclusive effect in later proceedings, 37 while an order granting a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) typically does not have preclusive
effect in subsequent proceedings unless the plaintiff states the same cause
of action that was the basis for dismissal in the first action.1 38 Similarly,
fraudulent joinder analysis is a jurisdictional question that should not
produce a judgment on the merits having preclusive effect.
However, other courts see the interplay between the defendant's heavy
burden and the plaintiff's need to meet a 12(b)(6)-like standard differently,
in a much more defendant-friendly way. In these jurisdictions, a defendant
may not need to carry such a burden if the plaintiff simply has not stated
a cause of action against the nondiverse defendant, regardless of whether
the plaintiff has a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant
that would defeat federal jurisdiction. 39 If, however, the plaintiff has
stated a cause of action against the nondiverse defendant, then the

131. Of course, the plaintiff should have an opportunity, in the motion to remand, to state a
claim against any nondiverse defendants.
132. See infra Part IV.F.3.
133. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 648-49 (5th Cir. 2003).
134. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
135. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b).
136. See id. ("If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.").
137. First Pacific Bancorp v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000).
138. See Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69, 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1967) stating the
elements of claim preclusion-including the requirement ofjudgment on the merits-and that"[i]f
the . . . dismissal was a holding ... that plaintiffs could in no case state in their complaint facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, such dismissal would be a judgment on merits and res
judicata").
139. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b); Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568,573 (5th Cir.
2004); Travis, 326 F.3d at 648.
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defendant's heavy burden to show no possibility of recovery is
triggered. 40
'
3. How Impossible Is "No Possibility"?
One area of the fraudulent doctrine that suffers from excessive 4 '
complexity is how the federal courts interpret the standard that the
defendant must meet to show fraudulent joinder: whether the plaintiff has
a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant. Courts have
defined this language in so many different ways that it is difficult to
imagine that a unified perspective on this aspect of the doctrine exists,
despite the attempt among some courts to rescue this aspect of the
doctrine. 42
'
A recent panel of the Fifth Circuit has attempted just this sort of rescue,
having suffered from differing adumbrations of this standard not simply
among its district courts, but also among its own appellate judges. In fact,
in some Fifth Circuit cases, both standards were stated in the same
opinion.'43 Some of the appellate panels in the Fifth Circuit have
interpreted the "no possibility" standard to mean that a denial of plaintiff's
motion to remand will occur only if the removing defendant proves that
the plaintiff has "absolutely no possibility" of recovery against the
nondiverse defendant, a standard that seems appropriately high for a
supposedly rigorous doctrine such as fraudulent joinder.'" A different

140. This complexity inherent to fraudulent joinder could be remedied if the courts avoid the
12(b)(6) analogy altogether. See infra Part IV.F.3. Even though the 12(b)(6) standard is
theoretically very plaintiff-friendly, like the fraudulent joinder standard should be, courts have
found ways of easing the burden of defendants who have filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6)
in other contexts to such an extent that the heightened pleading required of plaintiffs in that context
finds its way into the fraudulent joinder inquiry as well, confusing the courts as to what standard
truly applies. A better rule would be simply to look to the defendant to determine whether the
plaintiff cannot recover against the nondiverse defendant.
141. This complexity is also needless, as I attempt to show. See infra Part IV.F.2.
142. See Travis, 326 F.3d at 647-48.
143. See id. at 647 ("Neither our circuit nor other circuits have been clear in describing the
fraudulent joinder standard. The test has been stated by this court in various terms, even within the
same opinion.") (emphasis added) (citing Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694,699 (5th Cir.
1999)). As the Travis panel notes, one of the leading treatises on federal procedure and practice
deploys both interpretations of the standard without noting or rationalizing the difference. See id.
("Similarly, in summing up federal law, Moore's Federal Practice states at one point: 'To establish
fraudulent joinder, a party must demonstrate ... the absence of any possibility that the opposing
party has stated a claim under state law.' It then comments: 'The ultimate question is whether there
is arguably a reasonablebasis for predicting that state law might impose liability on the facts
involved."') (emphasis in original) (citing 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c][iv][C] (3d ed. 2002)).
144. See, e.g., Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F.3d 746,
751 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In order successfully to prove that nondiverse defendants have been
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standard has been applied in the Fifth Circuit under which the motion to
remand will be denied only if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff has
no "arguably . ..reasonable basis" on which to recover against the
nondiverse defendant, a standard that does not seem as consistent with a
rigorous doctrine like fraudulent joinder. 145 The Fifth Circuit sought to
harmonize these differences in Travis v. Irby, arguably with sleight of
hand, by stating that the differing standards were really the same, 146 while
at the same time explicitly favoring the reasonable basis language as a
better articulation than the "absolutely no possibility" standard. 147
4. Factual Trouble: Piercing the Pleadings
Perhaps the most obvious way in which the fraudulent joinder doctrine
is both complex and ambiguous concerns how the federal jurisdictions
approach the issue of what material to review when deciding the plaintiff's
motion to remand. The only point of true clarity is that the district court
may not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiff has
a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant. 4 This
restriction arises from the principle that the district court may not pre-try
the merits of the plaintiffs claims without undertaking discovery'
because to do so would be an "unconstitutional invasion" of the federal
district court upon the state court. 5 ' The federal court would be engaging
in such pre-trial before it was ever clear that the court had subject matter

fraudulently joined in order to defeat diversity, the removing party must demonstrate 'that there is
absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the instate defendant in state court."') (quoting Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256,
259 (5th Cir. 1995)).
145. See Travis,326 F.3d at 647 (stating that the fraudulentjoinder question is "whether there
is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability on the facts
involved").
146. Id.at 647-48 ("Although these tests appear dissimilar, 'absolutely no possibility' vs.
'reasonable basis,' we must assume that they are meant to be equivalent because each is presented
as a restatement of the other [in Moore's Federal Practice]....Any argument that a gap exists
between the 'no possibility' and 'reasonable basis' of recovery language was recently narrowed,
if not closed.").
147. See id. at 647 ("An examination of earlier cases reveals that the insertion of 'absolutely
no' into the possibility test is fairly recent. It was first used in Green v. Amerada Hess with no
indication that any change in the law was indicated.") (citing Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707
F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1983)).
148. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (stating
that "[t]here should be no need for an evidentiary hearing" after the district court has generally
resolved the record in favor of the plaintiff).
149. See id. at 546.
150. See 20 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, at § 8, at 35 (pointing out that when a federal
court does not remand a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction the refusal to remand
is "not simply wrong" but rather amounts to an "unconstitutional invasion").
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jurisdiction over the action.'51 Additionally, holding an evidentiary hearing
would be manifestly antagonistic to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and would be152inconsistent with generally resolving the record in favor of
the plaintiff.
The trouble with this aspect of the fraudulent joinder doctrine occurs,
first, because, even in the Fifth Circuit, it is never mandatory for a district
court to pierce the pleadings to decide whether there is fraudulent
joinder. 53 The district court may decide the fraudulent joinder question
simply from the face of the plaintiff's complaint, or the court may conduct
extensive discovery on the question. 54
' However, no clear standards are in
55
place to determine the conditions necessary for piercing the pleadings.
Second, no federal court has articulated what methodology applies when
examining such extrinsic evidence, or the relative weight such evidence
might have in the court's examination-beyond the rule that all disputed
issues of fact, and all ambiguous
questions of state law, are to be resolved
56
plaintiff.1
the
of
in favor
Third, the law is unclear as to what relation the court's examination of
extrinsic evidence, a factual inquiry, has with the fraudulent joinder
principle that disputed questions of fact are resolved in favor of the
plaintiff. For instance, if a plaintiff disputes a factual allegation made in
a defendant's sworn affidavit submitted in the course of the court's
piercing of the pleadings, but does so only in the unsworn arguments made
by the plaintiff's attorneys in the motion to remand, does that constitute a
"disputed issue of fact" to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff?.
But perhaps the most profound risk of the pierce-the-pleadings doctrine
is that the federal district court will impermissibly trample on the turf of
the state court and treat plaintiffs unfairly by ruling on the merits of the
plaintiff's case against the nondiverse defendant rather than on the
jurisdictional facts. This risk arises because the lack of standards and
methodology for the courts to apply in deciding the question increases
judicial discretion at the same time that it increases the judge's familiarity
with the merits of the case. This state of affairs likely makes it easier for

151. See, e.g., Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 546. Although piercing the pleadings does not
guarantee such an unconstitutional invasion, as does holding an evidentiary hearing, it does risk
such an invasion. See id However, the Supreme Court has held that at least limited piercing is
constitutionally acceptable. See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185-86
(1907). As I argue infra, limited piercing is also consistent with the other policy issues at stake in
fraudulent joinder. See infra Part IV.F. 1.
152. See Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 551.
153. See Smallwood v. 11.Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
154. See Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 551 n.14.
155. See Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573 (noting that "the decision regarding the procedure
necessary in a given case must lie within the discretion of the trial court").
156. See Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 551.
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the judge to decide the fraudulent joinder question, at least partially on the
merits. 57
The risk of an improper decision also arises because of the fungible
difference between jurisdictional facts and facts related to the merits of the
plaintiffs claims. For example, in the oft-cited United States Supreme
Court case Wecker, the defendant submitted a sworn affidavit that the
plaintiffs supervisor's duties were merely clerical and thus could not
establish liability.' Does this affidavit relate to purely jurisdictional facts?
Or, is that sworn allegation uncertain and contestable, thus a better matter
for discovery to ferret out?
5. Legal Trouble
Some appellate courts have noted that the fraudulent joinder inquiry is
an Erie problem, "but only [in] part."'5 9 This evidently means that while
the district court must examine state law to determine whether the plaintiff
has a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant, the district
court must not go so far as to predict what statement of the law the state's
highest court would apply on the relevant facts, as it would in the typical
Erie context. 60 After all, the district court has not yet determined that it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Thus, any
ambiguities in state law should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. By
contrast, if state law affirmatively precludes the plaintiffs recovery
against the nondiverse defendant on the facts alleged in the plaintiffs
complaint, then there is no "unconstitutional invasion" of the federal court
upon the state court.16' The case belongs in federal court and the motion
to remand is denied.

157. See Miller, supra note 114, at 1070-72 (stating that, among other things, a "culture of
management... gives the judge a sense of familiarity with the dispute that emboldens pretrial
disposition").
158. See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 184 (1907).
159. Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1968);
see also Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810-11 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that, "[u]nlike
most diversity cases (where a federal court is required to ascertain and apply state law no matter
how onerous the task), here [with respect to fraudulent joinder], the district court's task is limited
to determining whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might
impose liability based upon the facts involved.... [I]n its review of a fraudulent-joinder claim, the
court has no responsibility to definitively settle the ambiguous question of state law.").
160. See, e.g., Filla,336 F.3d at 810-11. This would also include the typical 12(b)(6) context,
in which the district court must go further than it arguably should in the fraudulent joinder context
to predict and apply state law. See Little v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 227 F. Supp. 2d 838, 846 (S.D.
Ohio 2002) (drawing a distinction between the extent the district court must delve into state law
under a fraudulent joinder standard and that under a 12(b)(6) standard).
161. See supra note 150.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

27

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
58,REVIEW
Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4

[Vol. 58

However, the risk that the district court will go too far in examining
state law inheres in this aspect of the fraudulent joinder inquiry as much
as the similar risk that the district court will go too far in deciding facts
before the court determines that it has jurisdiction over the case. At least
one court has held that it is possible for a court to delve too deeply into
questions of state law in the fraudulent joinder inquiry.'62
III. CIRCUIT DIFFERENCES REGARDING FRAUDULENT JOINDER

Roughly, the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits apply the fraudulent joinder analysis as a jurisdictional inquiry'63
to determine whether the plaintiff is barred from recovery against the
nondiverse defendant. Or, these circuits may stress that the fraudulent
inquiry is more friendly to the plaintiff than in the context of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).'64 All disputed issues of fact and ambiguities
in state law are decided in the plaintiffs favor. 6
Otherwise, circuits in this camp might differ on issues of scope or on
defining the "no possibility" standard. Some circuits in this camp
encourage the district courts to look beyond the pleadings to determine
whether fraudulent joinder exists, 166 and some do not. 67 Some circuits
define the "no possibility" of recovery language absolutely, 68 which
significantly increases the defendant's burden to show fraudulent joinder,
while others determine that the defendant need only show an absence of

162. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 853 (3d Cir. 1992) ("A claim which can
be dismissed only after an intricate analysis of state law is not so wholly insubstantial and frivolous
that it may be disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.").
163. See infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text. For this purpose I refer to these
jurisdictions as the "jurisdictional group," to be contrasted with the "12(b)(6) group." See infra
notes 187-202 for a discussion of the 12(b)(6) group.
164. See Batoff, 977 F.2d at 852 (contrasting the fraudulent joinder analysis with that under
Rule 12(b)(6), the latter of which is "more searching than that permissible when a party makes a
claim of fraudulent joinder").
165. See, e.g., Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (1 th Cir. 1998) (noting
that when the district court undertakes the fraudulent joinder analysis, the court "must evaluate
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any uncertainties about
the applicable law in the plaintiff's favor").
166. See id.("The determination of whether a resident defendant has been fraudulentlyjoined
must be based upon the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits
and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.").
167. See Lerma v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1014 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
("When analyzing whether ... [plaintiffs] can establish a cause of action against . . . [the
nondiverse qefendant ] I look at the allegations in the complaint.").
168. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422,426 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting the plaintiff
need only possess a "glimmer of hope" to succeed on the merits against the nondiverse defendant).
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a "reasonable basis" for recovery against the nondiverse defendant in the
record, 6 9 thus easing the defendant's burden to some degree.
On the other hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
undertake the fraudulent joinder analysis as they might engage in a Rule
12(b)(6) analysis to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of
0 If the plaintiff has
action against the nondiverse defendant or defendants.°"
not stated a claim on which relief can be granted against the nondiverse
defendant, then the motion to remand will be denied and the case will stay
in federal court. These circuits examine the plaintiffs complaint more
closely than those in the other camp to determine whether there is arguably
a reasonable basis on which the plaintiff could recover against all
nondiverse defendants. 17 ' Disputed issues of fact are supposedly decided
in favor of the plaintiff' 72 (albeit with the potential for defendant
manipulation), 73 but ambiguities in state law may not necessarily be so
decided, as the analogy of the fraudulent joinder inquiry to an inquiry
under Rule 12(b)(6) would indicate. Further, unlike what occurs in a
12(b)(6) inquiry, such jurisdictions widen the scope of the fraudulent
joinder inquiry by uniformly "pierc[ing] the pleadings" to examine
summary judgment-type evidence to assist in determining whether a
plaintiff's motion to remand should be denied. 174 In these jurisdictions, the
fraudulent joinder
inquiry runs deeper and is more searching than in the
7
other camp. 1

169. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that "joinder
is fraudulent 'where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim
against the joined defendant') (quoting Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d
Cir. 1985) (quoting Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233, 239 (N.D. Cal. 1980))).
170. See infra Part III.A.2, III.B.2.
171. See, e.g., Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
172. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003).
173. See id. at 649.
174. See supra Part II.B.4.
175. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
First Circuit jurisprudence on fraudulent joinder is thin. See, e.g., Mills v. Allegiance
Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting that "the First Circuit has not
articulated a standard for evaluating a claim of fraudulent joinder"). However, what jurisprudence
exists indicates that the First Circuit would likely follow the Fifth Circuit approach to fraudulent
joinder. See Gabrielle v. Allegro Resorts Hotels, 210 F. Supp. 2d 62,66 (D.R.I. 2002) (citing cases
from the Fifth Circuit on fraudulent joinder).
The District of Columbia Circuit has produced only two district court cases that apply
fraudulent joinder. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31
(D.D.C. 2000); Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 1998).
In the Brown case, the district court approached the fraudulent joinder question more like those
courts in the jurisdictional group. Id. at 76-78 (citing Fourth Circuit case law and relying on
jurisdictional emphasis in Miller Brewing, the leading case on fraudulent joinder, albeit one from
the Fifth Circuit). Of course, the Federal Circuit does not hear diversity cases.
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The net effects of these commitments are to stress or ease the
defendant's heavy burden to show fraudulent joinder, to emphasize how
generous the fraudulent joinder standard is to plaintiffs, or to hold
plaintiffs more accountable for the architecture of their lawsuits.
A. Scope of Inquiry
The federal circuits vary widely on the extent to which the district
courts are permitted to examine extrinsic evidence relevant to the
fraudulent joinder issue, and also on the extent to which the circuit courts
may encourage the district courts to view extrinsic evidence. However, all
of the circuits permit the practice of examining extrinsic evidence." 6 This
practice is both reasonable and constitutionally acceptable. From a
practical perspective, examining extrinsic evidence helps the district courts
decide the fraudulent joinder issue without being confined merely to
reviewing the plaintiffs pleadings. This practice is friendly to removing
defendants who might otherwise suffer a nearly impossible burden of
showing why the case should be in federal, not state court. This practice
is also friendly to plaintiffs who might be hamstrung by meeting extremely
liberal notice pleadings in state court only to find that federal pleading
standards are more stringent.
The primary question here, as it arises repeatedly in other aspects of the
fraudulent joinder doctrine, is how far does the district court go in
reviewing this extrinsic evidence? More precisely, what limitations restrict
a court in reviewing such material, beyond the obvious restriction on pretrying the merits of the plaintiff s claim against the nondiverse defendant?
Also, when is it prudent for a court not to consider extrinsic evidence when
deciding fraudulent joinder?
1. The Jurisdictional Group
The jurisdictional group's approach to the scope of inquiry issue in
fraudulent joinder is foreshortened and informal. While the federal courts
in this group do permit the district court to review extrinsic evidence to
determine the fraudulent joinder question, they do not emphasize the
court's freedom to do so, and often the courts in this group do not justify,
through citation either to controlling or persuasive authority, the district

176. See, e.g., Smallwood v. III. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004);
Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1998) (looking first to the
plaintiffs complaint to determine fraudulent joinder, and then to the affidavits submitted by the
parties); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457,464 (4th Cir. 1999); Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d 545 (5th
Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981 ). There are some isolated examples of district courts that choose not to
review extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Fort Motor Co., 934 F. Supp. 1005, 1007
(N.D. 111.1996); Katz v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 718 F. Supp. 1508, 1512 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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court's right to consider extrinsic evidence when deciding this question.'77
This approach is consistent with the jurisdictional emphasis that these
courts deploy when deciding issues of fraudulent joinder, an approach that
is mindful of not probing too deeply into the fraudulent joinder issue
because these courts understand the fraudulent joinder issue to be a
"preliminary jurisdictional" one.' 78 Furthermore, regarding inquiries into
state law, some of the courts in this group are likewise unwilling to probe
too deeply, lest the federal court decide matters that are better left to the
state courts.
For instance, the Second Circuit approach to this scope of inquiry issue
is first to examine the plaintiff's complaint to resolve the fraudulent
joinder issue and then to consider any evidence the defendant has
submitted.'79 However, the Second Circuit has never emphasized, or even
justified through citation to Supreme Court or other precedent, the district
court's freedom to pierce the pleadings.
A similar tack is taken in Third Circuit opinions, although one panel of
the Third Circuit has stated that the district court is empowered to consider
extrinsic evidence when deciding the fraudulent joinder issue, relying on
Tenth Circuit authority. 8 ' However, according to the Third Circuit, that
power is confined to a "limited piercing" of the plaintiff s complaint that
is to be contrasted, rather than aligned, with a "summary judgment type
inquiry. ' Furthermore, the Third Circuit has shown skepticism about a
federal district court's undertaking a detailed analysis of state law to
determine the essentially jurisdictional question of fraudulent joinder: "A
claim which can be dismissed only after an intricate analysis of state law
is not so wholly insubstantial and frivolous that it may be disregarded for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction."'8 2

177. See, e.g., Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 33 (3d Cir. 1985).
178. See, e.g., id. (noting that, as part ofthe fraudulentjoinder doctrine, to look too deeply into
the merits "would be inappropriate in this preliminary jurisdictional determination").
179. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) (looking first
to the plaintiff's complaint to determine fraudulent joinder); Pampilloniav. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138
F.3d 459,461-62 (2d Cir. 1998) (looking first to the plaintiff's complaint to determine fraudulent
joinder, and then to the affidavits submitted by the parties).
180. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Smoot v.
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 883 (10th Cir. 1967)).
181. See id.; see also Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 853 (3d Cir. 1992).
182. Batoff, 977 F.2d at 853. Fourth Circuit panels have likewise indicated that it is acceptable
for district courts within their jurisdictional ambit to pierce the pleadings, even to "consider the
entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means available." See, e.g., Mayes v.
Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999); AIDS Counseling and Testing Ctrs. v. Group W
Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Dodd v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 329
F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964)); Grennell v. W. S. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (S.D. W.
Va. 2004). However, the panel that has given the most thought to the fraudulent joinder question
has stated
that
the face of Repository,
the plaintiffs2006
complaint controls the scope of inquiry "unless 31
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The Tenth Circuit's approach is different in emphasis but similar in net
effect. The Circuit squarely permits district courts within its jurisdiction
to pierce the pleadings in deciding the fraudulent joinder question, but it
heightens the defendant's burden to prove fraudulent joinder beyond that
which obtains in other jurisdictions."83 According to Smoot, the "issues of
liability may not ordinarily be determined on a motion to remand," but it
is nevertheless "well settled that upon allegations of fraudulent joinder
designed to prevent removal, federal courts may look beyond the pleadings
to determine if the joinder, although fair on its face, is a sham or
fraudulent device to prevent removal.""' On the other hand, the
defendant's ordinarily heavy burden to prove fraudulent joinder is even
heavier in the Tenth Circuit.'85 The removing defendant's fraudulent
joinder argument
"must be pleaded with particularity and proven with
'86
certainty.

2. The 12(b)(6) Group
The circuits in this group, on the other hand, generally permit a wider
scope of inquiry on the fraudulent joinder issue than do those in the
jurisdictional group,' 87 or they often emphasize the trial court's power to
joinder is clearly improper." See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999)
(stating that "[tihe best way to advance this objective [ofjurisdictional rules] is to accept the parties
joined on the face of the complaint unless joinder is clearly improper").
183. See, e.g., Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 881-82 (10th Cir.
1967).
184. Id.
185. See McLeod v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 233 F.2d 242, 246 (10th Cir. 1956).
186. Id.; see also Smoot, 378 F.2d at 882 (requiring "complete certainty").
The Seventh Circuit has not explicitly decided the question of whether to pierce and to what
extent, although one panel has implicitly authorized the practice by relying on a removing
defendant's uncontested affidavit that the nondiverse defendant had nothing to do with the event
that is the subject of the suit. See Faucett v. Ingersoll-Rand Mining & Mach. Co., 960 F.2d 653,
654-55 (7th Cir. 1992). In this absence, district courts within the Seventh Circuit have determined
that a federal district court has at least some limited authority to pierce the pleadings to determine
the fraudulentjoinder question. See, e.g., Conkv. Richards & O'Neil, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956,961
(S.D. Ind. 1999) ("To begin with, as a general rule a district court facing a challenge to its subject
matter jurisdiction has some discretion in deciding how to address relevant factual disputes."). On
the other hand, other district courts in the Seventh Circuit have restricted the scope of their inquiry
on the fraudulent joinder question merely to the face of the plaintiff's complaint. See, e.g., Lerma
v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1014 (E.D. Wis. 1999) ("look[ing] at the
allegations in the complaint" only); Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 1005,
1007 (N.D. I11.
1996) (stating that the "Court's inquiry is limited to the factual assertions of Lynch's
complaint").
187. For one important exception-the Sixth Circuit-see infra note 202. As will be seen, the
Sixth Circuit generally straddles the line dividing the jurisdictional group from the 12(b)(6) group.
As to scope of inquiry, the Sixth Circuit is closer to the jurisdictional group, while as to the "no
possibility" standard, the circuit is divided and could be placed in either camp. However, as to the 32
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pierce the pleadings to decide the question, or both. Many of the circuits
within this group have formalized their commitment to pierce the
pleadings in the fraudulent joinder context, as in the Fifth Circuit, and the
courts typically justify their power to pierce with citation to precedent.'88
Finally, some of the courts analogize the scope of inquiry on the fraudulent
joinder question to that of a summary judgment scope of inquiry.'89
The Fifth Circuit is easily the most radical jurisdiction when it comes
to enabling district courts to consider evidence in the context of a
fraudulentjoinder inquiry. The wide scope of inquiry permitted in the Fifth
Circuit on the issue of fraudulent joinder had its strongest, if not its first,
articulation in the most significant fraudulent joinder case in any circuit,
' In that case, Judge Goldberg discussed the
B., Inc. v. MillerBrewing Co. 90
extent and nature of the inquiry that the Fifth Circuit's district courts must
apply when deciding fraudulent joinder questions:
In support of their removal petition, the defendants may
submit affidavits and deposition transcripts; and in support of
their motion for remand, the plaintiff may submit affidavits
and deposition transcripts along with the factual allegations
contained in the verified complaint. The district court must
then evaluate all of the factual allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all contested issues of
substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff.'9
Unlike some of the circuits in the jurisdictional group, the Miller
Brewing opinion does not indicate a need to consult the plaintiff's
complaint first.'92 Instead, the district court is permitted to delve into the
affidavits and deposition transcripts immediately, albeit with the universal
restriction that contested issues of fact be resolved in favor of the
plaintiff.' Ironically, however, despite the relatively wide scope of
inquiry on fraudulent joinder that the Miller Brewing panel set forth, the
panel was actually correcting the district court decision under review,
which had relied on an even wider scope of inquiry. The district court had

most crucial divide among the circuits on fraudulent joinder-whether the analysis is envisioned
as a narrow jurisdictional inquiry or as a more searching 12(b)(6) approach-the Sixth Circuit is
decidedly in the 12(b)(6) camp. For this reason, I place the Sixth Circuit within the 12(b)(6) group.
188. See, e.g., Smallwood v. 11. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
189. See, e.g., LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 1992).
190. 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981).
191. Id. at 549.
192. See id.
193. Id. But see Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573 (in which the majority indicated that the district
court must first examine the complaint to see if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action against the
the pleadings).
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conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing to determine if the plaintiff had
a possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant.' 94 In remarking
upon this phenomenon, the Miller Brewing appellate opinion quoted the
district court's hearing transcript, noting that "[a]t the conclusion of this
arduous proceeding, Judge Taylor [the district court judge] was moved to
comment that having 'spent about three days in this case... I virtually feel
like we've tried it.""195
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit analogizes the scope of inquiry in
fraudulent joinder to a summary judgment-like procedure relying on
summaryjudgment-type evidence.' 96 To be sure, panels of the Fifth Circuit
that make use of the summary judgment language often are careful to
distinguish their statement of the law regarding the scope of inquiry from
the standard applied to the facts and law concerning the plaintiff's claims
against the nondiverse defendant. 9 7 In that event, the standard cannot be
a summary judgment-like standard, even though the court is entitled to
review summary judgment-like evidence, because the courts are not
permitted to pre-try the
merits of the plaintiffs claims against the
198
nondiverse defendant.

Additionally, it is nearly an article of faith in the Fifth Circuit that its
district courts are not only permitted to pierce the pleadings to decide the
fraudulent joinder question, but are nearly compelled to do so.99 Another
indication of the Fifth Circuit's wide scope of inquiry on the fraudulent
joinder question is that one of the circuit's appellate panels felt the need
to develop a special rule to be applied when district courts within the
circuit actually choose not to pierce the pleadings to answer the fraudulent
joinder question.2"' This rule developed long after the rule that permitted
the district courts to pierce the pleadings. Finally, whenever courts within

194. Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 547.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 1992) ("In this circuit, a
removing party's claim of fraudulent joinder to destroy diversity is viewed as similar to a motion
for summary judgment. A court is to pierce the pleadings to determine whether, under controlling
state law, the non-removing party has a valid claim against the nondiverse parties.") (citations
omitted).
197. See, e.g., McKee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2004)
("[A]lthough the type of inquiry into the evidence is similar to the summary judgment inquiry, the
district court is not to apply a summary judgment standard but rather a standard closer to the Rule
12(b)(6) standard.").
198. Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 546.
199. But see supra note 107 for an indication that this approach may be weakening.
200. See Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239,246-47 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that the reviewing
court is limited to examining the complaint as a basis for the district court's fraudulent joinder
determination when the district court does not consider extrinsic evidence to decide the issue); see
also Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that a district
court's decision to pierce the pleadings is discretionary).
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the Fifth Circuit state that the circuit's district courts are entitled to pierce
the pleadings to assist in deciding the fraudulent joinder question, they cite
to precedent," 1 and there is a rich body of such precedent to which to
cite.2" 2

201. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 1992); Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d
382, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2000)); Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815-16 (5th Cir. 1993).
202. To cite just ten examples, chosen at random, see the following: Hornbuckle, 385 F.3d
538, 542 (5th Cir. 2004); Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 2003); GreatPlainsTrust Co.
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2002); Hart, 199 F.3d at
246-47; Burden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213,217 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1995); Cavalliniv. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256,263 (5th Cir. 1995); Fordv. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931,935 (5th
Cir. 1994); Carrierev. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1990); Miller Brewing,
663 F.2d at 548; Keating v. Shell Chem. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1980).
Unlike its approach to the jurisdictional question, the Eleventh Circuit has not technically
parted company with the Fifth Circuit when it comes to permitting district courts to pierce the
pleadings to decide the fraudulent joinder question. However, the Eleventh Circuit does not stress
the federal district court's right to pierce nearly to the extent that the Fifth Circuit does. Indeed,
only one panel of the Eleventh Circuit indicates that it is acceptable for district courts to pierce the
pleadings in this context, but not before adding that review of the plaintiff's complaint at the time
of removal begins the process, unlike the practice in the 12(b)(6) group: "The federal court makes
these determinations based on the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal; but the court may
consider affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties." Crowe v. Coleman, 113
F.3d 1536, 1538 (11 th Cir. 1997) (citing Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 549).
While the Ninth Circuit permits its district courts to pierce the pleadings to decide the
fraudulent joinder question, it does not do so nearly to the extent that the Fifth Circuit does. The
leading Ninth Circuit case, McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., holds that the removing defendant is
"entitled to present the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent." 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir.
1987). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's manner of treating the scope of inquiry issue is
longstanding. Indeed, McCabe, itself a 1987 case, cites to much older precedent on this: the 1951
Ninth Circuit case, Smith v. S. Pac. Co., 187 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1951). Id.
On the other hand, neither the Sixth nor the Eighth Circuit have determined the extent to which
the district court is empowered to consider extrinsic evidence. However, district courts within the
Sixth Circuit have embraced the "pierce the pleadings" approach of the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g.,
Sprowls v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 694, 697 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (citing Fifth
Circuit authority and stating that "the [c]ourt may look beyond the bare allegations of the complaint
and conduct a more searching inquiry"); Graphic Res. Group, Inc. v. Honeybaked Ham Co., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 822, 824-25 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (stating that the court "'is not bound by the allegations
of the pleadings, but may instead 'consider the entire record, and determine the basis ofjoinder by
any means available"") (quoting Brantley v. Vaughan, 835 F. Supp. 258, 261 (D.S.C. 1993)
(quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 1993))). Some district courts within
the Eighth Circuit have followed suit. See, e.g., Manning v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 304 F. Supp.
2d 1146, 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (reviewing defendant's affidavits to decide whether there was
fraudulent joinder); Wells' Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1031-32 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (citing extensive Fifth Circuit authority regarding "[p]iercing the
pleadings," and substantiating its right to consider extrinsic evidence in deciding fraudulentjoinder
without being
to the plaintiff's
complaint).
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B. Defining "No Possibilityof Recovery"
The "no possibility" standard of fraudulent joinder is defined in
different ways by many jurisdictions. One jurisdiction, notably within the
jurisdictional group, adumbrates the standard in a very liberal way by
stating that the motion to remand will be granted even if the plaintiff has
a mere "glimmer of hope" of recovery against the nondiverse defendant.2"3
On the other hand, some jurisdictions, notably those in the 12(b)(6) group,
look to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse
defendant, 2°4 easing the defendant's heavy burden to show fraudulent
joinder. Yet another jurisdiction,
the Tenth Circuit, treats the "no
205
literally.
standard
possibility"
1. The Jurisdictional Group
The circuits within the jurisdictional group generally interpret the
universal "no possibility" standard in different ways, but without going so
far as to look, at least exclusively, to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
claims against the nondiverse defendant. The extent to which the circuits
within this group interpret the "no possibility" standard literally has the
ultimate effect of underscoring the defendant's heavy burden to show
fraudulent joinder.
For instance, the Second Circuit deploys a standard ultimately derived
from Cockrell,2° the seminal Supreme Court decision on fraudulent
joinder. The leading case on fraudulent joinder in the Second Circuit,
Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,0 7 interprets the "no possibility"
standard such that the defendant meets its heavy burden to show fraudulent
joinder by showing that the plaintiff cannot defeat the defendant's "right
of removal by merelyjoining as defendants parties with no real connection

203. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that, to
defeat a defendant's claim of fraudulent joinder, "there need be only a slight possibility of a right
to relief. Once the court identifies this glimmer ofhope for the plaintiff, the jurisdictional inquiry
ends.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457,466 (4th
Cir. 1999).
204. See, e.g., Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806,810 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We believe that,
despite the semantical differences, there is a common thread in the legal fabric guiding fraudulentjoinder review. It is reason. Thus, a proper review should give paramount consideration to the
reasonableness of the basis underlying the state claim.").
205. Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (stating
that the fraudulent joinder "issue must be capable of summary determination and be proven with
complete certainty").
206. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914).
207. 138 F.3d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1998).
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with the controversy."2 8 The Second Circuit's articulation of this "no
possibility" standard is thus informal, especially when compared to the
voluminous interpolation of the standard in the Fifth Circuit.2" 9
After the considerable doctrinal confusion on fraudulent joinder until
the 1990s, the Third Circuit interpreted the "no possibility" standard to
stress the heavy burden on the removing defendant to show fraudulent
joinder. In Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,21 the panel laid to rest
confusion over the fraudulent joinder standard in the wake of
congressional revision to section 1447, establishing conclusively the
fraudulent joinder doctrine as one under which the defendant can defeat
the motion to remand by showing that the plaintiff has "'no reasonable
basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined
defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against
the defendant or seek a joint judgment. '"'2" Furthermore, the "no
possibility" standard is defined such that "'[i]f there is even a possibility
that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action
against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that
joinder was proper and remand the case to state court." 212 Then, in Batoff,
the Third Circuit developed a standard for fraudulent joinder such that the
defendant does not prove fraudulent joinder unless the plaintiff's claims
against the nondiverse defendant are "'wholly insubstantial and

208. Id. However, Pampilloniadoes use "cause of action" language when interpreting the "no
possibility" standard. Id.at 461. So, rather than stating that the defendant proves fraudulent joinder
when the plaintiff has no possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant, Pampillonia
states that fraudulent joinder is found when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can "state a
cause of action" against the nondiverse defendant. Id. This fact pushes the Second Circuit closer
to the 12(b)(6) group on fraudulent joinder; however, the circuit's commitment to imagining the
fraudulent joinder question as a jurisdictional inquiry, and not as a question regarding the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings, particularly among the circuit's district courts, places the
Second Circuit decidedly in the jurisdictional group.
Another Second Circuit case uses the same language, combining Cockrell with "cause of
action" language. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
Pampillonia,138 F.3d at 460-61).
209. See infra Part III.B.2.
210. 913 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1990).
211. Id. at Il1 (quoting Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir. 1985)
(quoting Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, 495 F. Supp 233, 239 (N.D. Cal 1980))). The Abels panel was
prescient enough not to apply the Rule 19 standard, see Abels, 770 F.2d at 32, which was
subsequently abandoned by Congress and replaced with section 1447.
212. Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111 (quoting Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (1 th
Cir. 1983)). This "even a possibility" approach, hardly an interpretation of the "no possibility"
standard, is really a simple restatement of it. At the same time, the opinion makes use of 12(b)(6)
language, specifically the slight possibility that a plaintiff might "state[] a cause of action" against
a nondiverse defendant. See id. However, the detailed distinction the Third Circuit draws between
the jurisdictional question and the 12(b)(6) question in Batoff decidedly places the Third Circuit
and accompanying text.
See infra
notes 213-142006
in the jurisdictional
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''

a standard more consistent with the jurisdictional approach
the Third Circuit currently applies." 4
The Fourth Circuit is the most radical of all circuits in the jurisdictional
group when it comes to interpreting the "no possibility" standard,
indicating that if the plaintiff has a mere "glimmer of hope" of recovery
against the nondiverse defendant, then the case will be remanded to state
court.2" 5 In Hartley v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the appellate panel
stressed how terribly difficult it is for a defendant to show that the plaintiff
has "no possibility" of recovery against the nondiverse defendant.216
According to this panel, "ultimate success is not required to defeat
removal. Rather, there need be only a slight possibility of a right to relief.
Once the court identifies this glimmer of hope for the plaintiff, the
'
jurisdictional inquiry ends."217
frivolous,'

213. Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lunderstadt v.
Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1989)).
214. However, to describe the plaintiff's possibility of recovery against the nondiverse
defendant, the Batoff opinion does use the term "colorable," id. at 852, a term often used by those
courts I place in the 12(b)(6) group. Unlike the Batoffopinion, however, those in the 12(b)(6) group
use the term "colorable" to describe whether the plaintiff has arguably a reasonable basis for
recovery against the nondiverse defendant, a standard which is at odds with the Third Circuit's
"wholly insubstantial and frivolous" understanding of the plaintiff's possibility of recovery. See
infra Part III.B.2.
215. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1999).
216. Id. at 424.
217. Id.at 426 (citations omitted). Among those circuits comprising the jurisdictional group,
the Seventh Circuit comes close to articulating a "reasonable basis" standard as a way of
interpreting the "no possibility" standard. In the leading case, Poulosv. NaasFoods, Inc., 959 F.2d
69 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Cudahy's opinion uses the term "reasonable" in one significant place. Id.
at 73. For this Seventh Circuit panel, the district court "must engage in an act of prediction: is there
any reasonablepossibility that a state court would rule against the non-diverse defendant?" Id.
(emphasis added). However, the general thrust of the opinion is to avoid the sort of reasonableness
inquiry exemplified by the Fifth Circuit and others in the 12(b)(6) group. For instance, the Seventh
Circuit's opinion stresses that "in most cases fraudulentjoinder involves a claim against an in-state
defendant that simply has no chance ofsuccess, whatever the plaintiff's motives." Poulos, 959 F.2d
at 73. (emphasis added). In particular, the Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the future (on
"prediction") generally eases the burden on the plaintiff and specifically removes emphasis from
the plaintiff's pleadings, which instead look to the past. See id. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit
approach is to look backward at the plaintiff's pleadings and other materials. See infraPart III.B.2.
The Tenth Circuit has not issued a recent published opinion in which the court has analyzed a
fraudulent joinder issue directly, nor has the circuit explicitly interpreted the "no possibility"
standard. However, a recent unpublished decision states the "no possibility" standard and then
proceeds to align itself with stringent doctrine among the jurisdictional group, particularly Batoff
of the Third Circuit, and Pampilloniaof the Second Circuit. See Montano v. Allstate Indem., No.
99-2225,2000 WL 525592, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 14,2000). The opinion also cites the leading case
on fraudulent joinder in the Tenth Circuit, 1967's Smoot v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
RailroadCo., for Smoot's stringent requirement that the fraudulent joinder "issue must be capable
of summary determination and proven with complete certainty." Smoot, 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th 38
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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The Eleventh Circuit has deployed the "reasonable basis" language in
one appellate opinion, relying on Miller Brewing's articulation of the "no
possibility" standard,2" 8 especially insofar as Miller Brewing remains
binding case law in the Eleventh Circuit as it was decided several weeks
before the Fifth Circuit split into a smaller Fifth and new Eleventh Circuit
in 1981. In this respect, one Eleventh Circuit panel states that fraudulent
joinder does not exist when there is "a reasonable basis for predicting that
the state law might impose liability on the facts involved" against the
nondiverse defendant.219 On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit otherwise
utilizes such a different approach to fraudulent joinder from the Fifth
Circuit that its reading of Miller Brewing is likewise different. In this
respect, the Crowe panel of the Eleventh Circuit has used the Miller
Brewing standard to stress the extreme difficulty defendants face in
proving fraudulent joinder:
For a remand, the plaintiff's burden is much lighter than that
[in the case of summary judgment]: after drawing all
reasonable inferences from the record in the plaintiff's favor
and then resolving all contested issues of fact in favor of the
plaintiff, there need only be 'a reasonable basis for predicting
that the state law might impose liability on the facts
involved.'22
Then, too, another Eleventh Circuit case, albeit an older one, stresses that
the motion to remand will be granted, if there is "even a possibility" of
recovery against the nondiverse defendant.22 '

Cir. 1967). Otherwise, the district courts within the Tenth Circuit have stated, but not interpreted,
the "no possibility" standard. See, e.g., Cooper v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1157 (D. Kan. 2004); Bd of County Comm'rs of Mesa v. At. Fid., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 499, 500 (D.
Colo. 1996).
As I argue infra, treating the "no possibility" standard literally is the correct approach, and not
interpreting it to add further complexity and nuance to what is already a complicated doctrine, or
to ease the defendant's heavy burden to show fraudulent joinder. See infra Part IV.F.2.
218. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1542 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (citing B., Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 550 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) and quoting its "reasonable basis"
standard).
219. Id. at 1540 (quoting Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172,17677 (5th Cir. 1968)).
220. Id. at 1541-42 (emphasis in original) (quoting Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 550 (quoting
Suleski, 391 F.2d at 177)) (emphasis added).
221. Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 1983).
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2. The 12(b)(6) Group
The circuits within this group generally articulate the "no possibility"
standard by stating that fraudulent joinder is proved either when the
defendant shows that the plaintiff has no "colorable basis" on which to
recover against the nondiverse defendant, or when there is "no arguably
reasonable basis on which a state court might impose liability" against the
nondiverse defendant. These standards are closely aligned, if not
interchangeable. They indicate even greater skepticism of the plaintiffs
claims against the nondiverse defendant than the standards applied in the
jurisdictional group.
The leading Fifth Circuit approach to the "no possibility" standard has
been to deploy one of two standards, either an arguably "reasonable basis"
standard or an "absolutely no possibility" standard." The latter standard
is both newer and less common than the former. One panel even used both
standards in the same opinion.223
A recent case, Travis v. Irby,224 sought, among other things, to rectify
this apparent imbalance by stating that the two standards mean the same
thing: "Any argument that a gap exists between the 'no possibility' and
'reasonable basis' of recovery language was recently narrowed, if not
closed., 225 According to the Travis panel, the better articulation of the
standard is the following:
[T]he court determines whether that party has any possibility
of recovery against the party whose joinder is questioned. If
there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the
state law might impose liability on the facts involved, then
there is no fraudulentjoinder. This possibility,however, must
be reasonable,not merely theoretical.226
As a result, the Fifth Circuit's view of the "no possibility language" is in
sharp opposition to those jurisdictions, like the Second, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuit, that may find that a plaintiffs theoretical possibility of
recovery against a nondiverse defendant is sufficient to grant the motion
to remand.
However, there is yet another strain in the Fifth Circuit in applying the
"colorable" interpretation of the "no possibility" standard, particularly as

222. See supranotes 21 and 143.
223. See supranotes 21 and 143.
224. 326 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003).
225. Id. at 648.
226. Id.(emphasis in original) (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
& Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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it has been used since 1962 in Parks v. New York Times Co. 2 2 7 In that case,
the Fifth Circuit panel relied on older Eighth Circuit authority to apply a
"colorable" standard that was further adumbrated to include both a
"reasonable basis" component and a component finding fraudulentjoinder
when the nondiverse defendant "could not possibly" be held liable.228
According to the Parks panel, the Eighth Circuit case teaches that the
determination of fraudulent joinder is to be based on whether there was
a real intention on colorable grounds to procure a joint
judgment .... [T]here must be some reasonable basis for
believing that there is joint liability. The joinder is fraudulent
if it is clear that, under the law of the state in which the action
is brought, the facts asserted by the plaintiff as the basis for
the liability of the resident defendant could not possibly
create such liability so that the assertion of the cause of
action is as a matter of local law plainly a sham and
frivolous.2 29

A much more recent Fifth Circuit case also makes use of the "colorable"
standard.230
Using both the "colorable basis" and the "arguably reasonable basis"
language in its appellate opinions, the Sixth Circuit demonstrates that the
"colorable basis" and "arguably reasonable basis" standards are closely
aligned. Of two significant appellate opinions, the older of the two,
Alexander v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.,23' utilizes the "arguably[]
reasonable basis" standard, relying upon Fifth Circuit authority.23 2 The
other, Coyne v. American Tobacco Co.,2 33 utilizes a "colorable basis"
test, 234 as does one other recent case. 235 The "colorable basis" test appears
227. 308 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1962) (citing Morris v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 68
F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1934)).
228. Id.
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 180 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[t]o determine
whether the plaintiffs had a colorable cause of action, the district court applied Florida law"). Of
course, the Fifth Circuit has issued so many fraudulent joinder opinions that deviation from the
dominant or best articulation of the standard becomes more likely than it is in those jurisdictions
that have less exposure to fraudulent joinder. However, the Fifth Circuit's high level of exposure
to fraudulent joinder has had more substantial costs, such that the doctrine has become skewed and
has lost touch with the federal policies that drive it. See infra Part IV.F.
231. 13 F.3d940(6thCir. 1994).
232. Id. at 949 (citing Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 176 (5th
Cir. 1968)).
233. 183 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 1999).
234. Id. at 493 (noting that "if there is a colorable basis for predicting that a plaintiff may
recover against non-diverse defendants, this Court must remand the action to state court").
235. Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999).
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to be simply a restatement of the "reasonable basis" test, under the Sixth
Circuit approach, because both standards are derived from the same Fifth
Circuit opinion, Bobby Jones GardenApartments, Inc. v. Suleski, decided
in 1968.236 One district court within the Sixth Circuit, for instance, presents
the two tests in just this way:
"Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the inquiry is
whether there is at least a colorable claim against the
nondiverse parties in state court. That is, 'the question is
whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting
that the state law might impose liability on the facts
involved. "237
C. A JurisdictionalQuestion Versus a 12(b)(6) Question
The most significant distinction among the federal courts is how they
generally understand the fraudulent joinder doctrine. The leading circuit,
the Fifth Circuit, applies a 12(b)(6)-like standard to the plaintiffs claims
against the nondiverse defendant to determine fraudulent joinder.
However, the Third and Fourth Circuits are committed to a different
approach. In those circuits, to apply a 12(b)(6)-like standard to the
plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant is to risk a decision on
the merits, when the sole issue before the court is jurisdictional.
236. 391 F.2d 172, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1968).
237. Benincasa v. Flight Sys. Auto. Group, L.L.C., 242 F. Supp. 2d 529,535 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(quoting Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940,949 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Suleski, 391
F.2d at 176)).
The Eighth Circuit also deploys the term "colorable" when interpreting the "no possibility"
language. One of the more significant cases on fraudulent joinder in general, Filla v. Norfolk
Southern Railway Co., is much like the Sixth Circuit in using the "colorable" and "reasonable
basis" interpretations of the "no possibility" language almost interchangeably. 336 F.3d 806, 810
(8th Cir. 2003). For this Eighth Circuit panel, a claim is "colorable" if "state law might impose
liability on the resident defendant under the facts alleged." Id. at 810 (emphasis in original). The
panel then goes on to use the "reasonable basis" language repeatedly. See, e.g., id. at 810-11.
The Ninth Circuit has offered a more informal view of the "no possibility" standard than others
in the 12(b)(6) group, one that does not so much interpret the "no possibility" language as it does
adopt an alternative articulation of the standard derived from Moore's Federal Practice and
Procedure.See McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). According to
the McCabe panel, "[i] f the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and
the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the joinder of the resident defendant
is fraudulent." Id. at 1339. Deciding the fraudulent joinder question based on whether the plaintiff
has failed to state a cause of action against the nondiverse defendant, and whether that failure is
obvious under settled state law, is not as favorable to defendants as the "reasonable basis" standard.
Adding the second qualification, that the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action be obvious
under state law, and not simply whether the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, gives more leeway
both to plaintiffs and to state courts than does the reasonable basis standard, which is more often
linked with a heightened 12(b)(6) approach.
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1. The Jurisdictional Group
The courts within this group, particularly the Third and Fourth Circuits,
generally imagine the fraudulent joinder issue as a jurisdictional question
only. In this respect, these jurisdictions generally resist or deny any view
that the fraudulent joinder issue is a Rule 12(b)(6) matter in disguise.
Some go so far as to suggest that fraudulent joinder is more akin to a
Rule 12(b)(1) question of subject matter jurisdiction.238 Furthermore, the
courts within this group seek to avoid analyzing the merits of the
plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant, for many reasons.
Otherwise, jurisdictions within this group may emphasize the defendant's
heavy burden to such an extent that the net effect of the approach is to
stress the jurisdictional question before the court, not whether the
plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant are legally sufficient to
survive a 12(b)(6) motion.
The Third Circuit, like the Fourth, has decided without ambivalence
that the fraudulent joinder question is a jurisdictional question only. In
Batoff, the Third Circuit panel reversed the district court precisely for
applying a 12(b)(6) standard to the plaintiffs claims against the
nondiverse defendant, despite that the district court did not cite to Rule
12(b)(6):
[T]he [district] court concluded that it could dismiss [the
nondiverse defendant] from the action simply because
Batoff's complaint "fails to state a valid claim" against him.
Thus, while the court did not characterize its analysis as being
the same as it would make on a ruling on a motion to dismiss
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), that is exactly what it was. 39
According to this panel, a 12(b)(6) inquiry is "more searching" than that
which is appropriate in the fraudulent joinder context.24 ° As such, "it is
possible that a party is not fraudulently joined, but that the claim against
that party ultimately is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted., 241 The panel sought to avoid a "penetrating"
inquiry into the merits of the plaintiffs claims against the nondiverse
defendant out ofjurisdictional reservations the panel founded on Supreme
Court precedent.242 Relying on Neitzke v. Williams,243 the Batoff panel

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id.at 852.
Id.
Id. at 853.
490 U.S. 319 (1989).
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stressed the distinction between a claim that could be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) and a frivolous claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.24
The Fourth Circuit goes even further in this jurisdictional approach
than does the Third. In Hartley v. CSX Transportation,Inc.,245 the Fourth
Circuit panel, citing the Third Circuit's Batoff opinion, stated that the
fraudulent joinder standard is more favorable to the plaintiff than the
already plaintiff-friendly 12(b)(6) standard. 46 The panel was reviewing a
district court's denial of a motion to remand over the issue of whether the
public duty rule applied to bar the plaintiffs claim against the nondiverse
defendant.247 Reversing and remanding, the panel held that "[i]n all events,
a jurisdictional inquiry is not the appropriate stage of litigation to
resolve ... various uncertain questions of law and fact."24 The district
court was obligated to determine whether all six elements of the public
duty rule were met to bar the plaintiffs claims against the nondiverse
defendant, six elements on which there was a "judgment call at every
turn. 249 Granting the motion to remand, the panel decided that
"U]urisdictional rules direct judicial traffic. They function to steer
litigation to the proper forum with a minimum of preliminary fuss.""25 The
district court, on the other hand, erred by misunderstanding the function
shifted the burden of proof
of such jurisdictional rules, and effectively
251
from the defendant to the plaintiff.
2. The 12(b)(6) Group
While the courts in this group are frequently mindful of the
jurisdictional pratfalls inherent to the fraudulent joinder analysis, they

244. Batoff, 977 F.2d at 853; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2005) ("Proceedings in forma
pauperis").
245. 187 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 1999).
246. Id. at 424 ("This standard is even more favorable to the plaintiff than the standard for
ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).").
247. Id.
248. Id.at 425.
249. Id.at 424.
250. Id.at 425.
251. Id.Similarly, the Second Circuit's leading Pampillonia case and its district courts
imagine the fraudulent joinder doctrine stringently, to the point of aligning the circuit more with
the jurisdictional group than the 12(b)(6) group. Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459,
461 (2d Cir. 1998). However, this stringency is focused more on the defendant's heavy burden to
show fraudulent joinder than on a need to imagine the question as primarily jurisdictional. For
instance, Pampilloniaemphasizes that the removing defendant must meet a high "clear and
convincing" standard to prove fraudulent joinder and defeat the motion to remand. Id. In this
respect, Pampillonialikely took seriously the leading Second Circuit district court opinion on
fraudulent joinder, which imagined the defendant's burden in similar terms. See
Sonnenblick-Goldman Co. v. ITT Corp., 912 F. Supp. 85, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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almost invariably use a 12(b)(6) approach to understand and analyze the
fraudulent joinder question. That is, the plaintiff must survive a 12(b)(6)like inquiry on the plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant to
see the court grant the motion to remand. Often, the courts will not
explicitly cite to Rule 12(b)(6) to indicate that they are utilizing this
approach. However, by applying standards resembling or incorporating the
language of 12(b)(6), particularly language involving whether the plaintiff
has "state[d] a cause of action 25 2 against the nondiverse defendant, these
jurisdictions are decidedly on different ground from those courts within the
jurisdictional group, which often explicitly deem the 12(b)(6) approach to
be improper.
Again, the leading circuit in this respect is the Fifth, which has
explicitly adopted a 12(b)(6) approach in deciding questions of fraudulent
joinder. Since the 1960s, the Fifth Circuit has used 12(b)(6)-like language
to define the fraudulent joinder analysis.253 However, the circuit
definitively embraced the 12(b)(6) approach in a recent, authoritative
opinion on fraudulent joinder, Travis v. Irby,54 which summarizes and
analyzes much of the prior Fifth Circuit case law on fraudulent joinder.
Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the Travis panel noted that "[o]ur cases
have also noted the similarity of the test for fraudulent joinder and the test
for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion alleging failure to state a claim. '255 According
to this panel, if prior Fifth Circuit precedent establishes the fraudulent
joinder standard as whether there is a "possibility that [plaintiff] has set
forth a valid cause of action," then "[t]his language appears adopted from
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard under which 'the central issue is whether, in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claimfor
relief.' '21 6 However, the opinion later distinguished the 12(b)(6) standard
applied in the fraudulent joinder context from the scope of inquiry to be
applied as part of the fraudulent joinder analysis that, unlike in the case of
12(b)(6), is not limited to the pleadings. 7

252. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
253. See Parks v. N.Y. Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating that "[t]he

joinder may be fraudulent if the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against the resident
defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state") (citing JAMES WM.
MOORE, MOORE'S COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE, 234-36 (1949)). This is
also the fraudulentjoinder standard adopted in the Ninth Circuit. See McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp.,
811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) ("If the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a
resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the joinder
of the resident defendant is fraudulent.").
254. 326 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003).
255. Id.at 648.
256. Id.(emphasis in original) (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
& Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)).
257. Id.The Sixth Circuit's Coyne opinion utilizes "cause of action" language in stating its
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Like the Fifth Circuit's significant Travis opinion, the Eighth Circuit's
leading Filla opinion attempted to rationalize or harmonize differing
fraudulent joinder standards. 8 In the process, the opinion stressed the
"reasonable basis" test while at the same time using "cause of action"
language to define the panel's approach to the fraudulent joinder
question."' In doing so, the panel also relied on Fifth Circuit authority.26 °
The longest and most thoughtful district court opinion on fraudulent
joinder within the Eighth Circuit, Filla likewise balances the 12(b)(6)
approach against the court's view of the fraudulent joinder question to
show why the 12(b)(6) approach is correct: "In many respects, the
standards for determining a question of fraudulent joinder are analogous
to the standards applicable to a 'motion
to dismiss for failure to state a
26
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

fraudulent joinder standard, relying upon language utilized in the circuit's leading Alexander
opinion. Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[t]o prove
fraudulent joinder, the removing party must present sufficient evidence that a plaintiff could not
have established a cause of action against non-diverse defendants under state law") (citing
Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added). This
language is consistent with the Fifth Circuit approach, albeit without going so far as to cite to Rule
12(b)(6), insofar as Alexander relies extensively on Fifth Circuit authority on the same issue.
Alexander, 13 F.3d at 949 (citing Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172,
176 (5th Cir. 1968); Tedder v. F.M.C. Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1979)). On the other hand,
some district courts in the Sixth Circuit have gone the other way, favoring ajurisdictional approach
rather than a 12(b)(6) approach to fraudulent joinder. See, e.g., Little v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 227
F. Supp. 2d 838, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ("agree[ing] with the Third and Fourth Circuits that the
benefit of the doubt given a plaintiff as part of the fraudulent joinder inquiry should be more
deferential than even that given under Rule 12(b)(6)"); Hunt v. Ring, 946 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) ("I continue to believe that such analysis is best left to state judges, who have greater
expertise in state law.").
258. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting "semantic[]"
differences in various fraudulent joinder doctrines but also seeing a "common thread" among them:
"reason").
259. Id.
260. Id. at 810-11 (citing Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003); Badon v. RJR
Nabisco Inc., 236 F.3d 282, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2000); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 180
(5th Cir. 2000)).
261. Wells' Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1034 (N.D.
Iowa 2001). However, despite this commitment, this district court developed a convincing
rationale, consistent with Rule 12(b)(6) as it actually stands, justifying a limited piercing of the
pleadings to decide fraudulent joinder questions. Id. at 1034-35. See also infra Part IV.B.I for
further discussion of this approach to piercing the pleadings.
The Ninth Circuit, like the Sixth and the Eighth, does not explicitly commit itself to a 12(b)(6)
approach, but the language of its standard includes the term "cause of action" and what typically
follows for plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse defendants. See McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339. The
district courts within the Ninth Circuit have elaborated on this implication, often sounding much
like the Fifth Circuit in its 12(b)(6) approach. For example, one recent district court stated the
fraudulent joinder standard in this way: "While the test for fraudulent joinder resembles a Rule
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IV. LIMITING FRAUDULENT JOINDER

A. Introduction
Fraudulent joinder review should be more limited in scope than it is in
the Fifth Circuit, the circuit that applies the doctrine most expansively.
Even among the courts that are in the jurisdictional group, fraudulent
joinder review should be refined to be more consistent with the doctrine's
policy justifications. These reforms would not only reflect the strong
federal policies underlying congressional enactments, but also reinforce
constitutional understandings. Further, reforms would be more in keeping
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including policies favoring
judicial economy. These sources stress that the fraudulent joinder question
is one of jurisdiction rather than one of filtering out apparently frivolous
claims and that review shall be limited in scope.262
B. The Removal Statutes
The jurisdictional statutes provide the strongest evidence of an
authoritative federal policy system supporting a limited fraudulent joinder
doctrine. While there is no official statutory policy preventing plaintiffs
from destroying diversity jurisdiction,263 there is a specific statutory
provision preventing plaintiffs from improperly or collusively creating
federal jurisdiction, under section 1359.264 It is axiomatic that the federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that the lower federal courts
take their jurisdiction pursuant to congressional enactment.265 Indeed, if it

12(b)(6) analysis in that the Court accepts non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint as
true and does not consider the merits of defenses (other than procedural bars) claimed by the
resident defendant, the Court's inquiry is broader than under Rule 12(b)(6)." TPS Utilicom Servs.,
Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
262. To be sure, the doctrine's abuse in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere is not an unmitigated
abuse, and there are numerous examples of courts in that circuit that state and apply the fraudulent
joinder standard as the essentially jurisdictional question it is. However, the trend for judicial
overreaching is both rising and at its strongest in those jurisdictions. In the end, the issue of federal
court divergence on fraudulent joinder is a question of degree: How much documentary material
will the district court review? How much will the district court test the plaintiff's complaint? How
much will the district court probe into state law?
263. See 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERALPRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
§ 3641, at 152 (3d ed 1998 & Supp. 2005) ("Curiously, there is no statute that expressly inhibits
the use of devices to defeat federal jurisdiction.").
264. See id. at § 3637 ("A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made orjoined to invoke
the jurisdiction of such court.") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1359).
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("It is a 47
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chose to do so, Congress might even be able to eliminate the lower federal
courts under its Article III powers. 2 s
Congress has, pursuant to its power, constructed an elaborate system
of federal courts. Because the Constitution permits the federal courts to
hear controversies between citizens of different states, Congress, in giving
the federal courts jurisdiction under this provision, necessarily regulates
the interplay between federal and state courts, including any forum
shopping that may result.
Congress chose to enact statutes that gave plaintiffs the initial choice
of forum, but also enabled defendants to remove cases to federal court
under limited circumstances. Removal is proper only when there exists
complete diversity,2 67 a doctrine consistent with long-held Supreme Court
jurisprudence, 268 and when an amount-in-controversy requirement is
met. 269 Although Congress has ratified and accepted the Court's stringent
definition of diversity as complete diversity, it is not required to do so. If
Congress so desired, it could make it easier for litigants to reach federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction by requiring something less than
complete diversity.27 Additionally, the amount-in-controversy requirement
is a bar to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, a requirement
that has vastly outpaced inflation over the past fifteen years, from more
than $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs in 1987,271 to now more than
$75,000 as the minimum threshold
for access to the federal forum,
272
assuming complete diversity.
fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal
jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor
evaded.").
266. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress mayfrom time to time ordain and
establish.") (emphasis added).
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2005) (stating that the district courts have original
jurisdiction over all cases and controversies between citizens of different states). The complete
diversity requirement is met when all persons on one side of the case are citizens of different states
than all persons on the other side. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267-68 (1806).
268. See Strawbridge, 7 U.S. at 267-68.
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (requiring more than $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs).
270. Indeed Congress has recently done so in 2005's Class Action Fairness Act and 2002's
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, both of which apply a minimal diversity requirement
in certain situations. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1369, 1453(c). However, these are exceptions
to the general commitment of Congress to restrict access to the federal courts, a commitment that
reaches back several decades at minimum. See infra text accompanying notes 295-301.
271. The Judicial Improvements Act increased the minimum from $10,000 to $50,000. Pub.
L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
272. See Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)). Note also that for federal question cases there was once an amount-in-controversy
requirement, indicating congressional intent to restrict access to federal court even further and
illustrating the axiom that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, owing their very 48
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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Complete diversity is itself a stringent requirement to meet for proper
removal jurisdiction, but the removal statute adds an additional
requirement: A case will not be properly removable if one or more of the
defendants is a resident of the forum state, even though there may be
complete diversity of citizenship.273 Further, there are time limits on
removal, permitting defendants only thirty days to remove, after having
been served with state court process.274 However, the statute moderates this
stricture by permitting defendants to remove within thirty days after the
case becomes removable by virtue of "receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or
'
other paper,"275
thus preventing plaintiffs' fraudulent joinder from
precluding removal by manipulating the defendant's deadline. On the other
hand, a case may not be removed more than one year after the action has
begun, even though the action is otherwise removable276 a provision that
was added in the 1988 amendments that raised the amount-in-controversy
from more than $10,000 to more than $50,000.277
To be sure, the plaintiffs are also governed by a thirty-day rule for
filing a motion to remand after removal;27 8 but even if the plaintiffs fail to
fulfill this timing requirement, there is no waiver because if "it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
' Even if the plaintiff fails to move to remand, the district
remanded."279
court may still remand the case sua sponte18' Removal jurisdiction on the
basis of diversity is, at base, a question of subject matter jurisdiction for
the federal court. As such, the plaintiff cannot simply waive its rights

existence to congressional enactment under Article III, and that state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, charged with the duty of applying federal law under Article VI.
On the other hand, the amount-in-controversy requirement is not a serious bar to federal
jurisdiction for removing defendants, excepting class actions perhaps. While the removing
defendant does bear the burden of showing that the amount-in-controversy requirement is not met,
like that of the complete diversity requirement, the defendant's burden in this respect is
considerably lighter because there must be certainty that the amount is less than the threshold
before the judge will find that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
273. See28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 201,1016, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
279. Id. (emphasis added).
280. See id.; see also Darras v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1068, 1069 (N.D. III.
1985) (remanding the removed diversity case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction);
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("Ifat any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter
the caseRepository,
shall be remanded.").
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through inaction to contest this fundamental issue,"' nor can the district
court avoid the issue. If the district court hears the case even though it has
no subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment can be vacated on appeal,
assuming that no other independent grounds for subject matterjurisdiction
had arisen after removal.282 The federal court is charged with a continuing
duty to inquire into the basis for its jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action283 because a federal constitutional invasion would occur were
the federal court to try the case without subject matter jurisdiction.284
Furthermore, defendants are governed by restrictions giving them
incentive not to remove improvidently. First, the statute itself notes that
defendants are governed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in removing, and they may be susceptible to sanctions for
violating that rule.285 The statute also empowers the district court to require
the removing defendant to pay to the plaintiff any "just costs and any
actual expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of the
' An additional restriction is that the case may not be properly
removal."286
removed to federal court unless all defendants consent to removal,287
although federal courts do not require the consent of nominal parties,
parties that have not been served, or parties that have allegedly been
fraudulently joined to defeat removal.288
Congressional intent to limit federal jurisdiction on the basis of
diversity is most acute when one considers the procedural results following
a district court's granting a motion to remand. Simply put, there are none;
the matter is closed. Unless the case is a civil rights case or particular sort

281. See Berger Levee Dist. v. United States, 128 F.3d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1997).
282. But see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1996). In Caterpillar, the state
case was removed, despite that complete diversity did not exist and despite that the plaintiff
unsuccessfully moved to remand. Id. at 65-66. Nevertheless, complete diversity came into existence
prior to trial and through judgment. Id.at 66. That the jurisdictional defect was remedied once and
for all early in the litigation prompted the Court to uphold the district court judgment in the name
of "finality, efficiency, and economy." Id.at 75.
283. See, e.g., Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 1998)
("[Flederal courts have a continuing obligation to inquire into the basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction to satisfy themselves that jurisdiction to entertain an action exists.").
284. See 20 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, at § 8, at 35; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
285. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (implicity barring frivolous removal).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
287. See, e.g., Holder v. City of Atlanta, 925 F. Supp. 783,784 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("'All named
defendants must consent to or join the petition for removal."') (quoting Kuhn v. Brunswick Corp.,
871 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (N.D. Ga. 1994)).
288. See Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the
"unanimity rule may be disregarded.., where a defendant has been fraudulentlyjoined"); Jernigan
v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that it would be "nonsensical" to
apply the unanimity rule in the case of fraudulent joinder).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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of class action,28 9 section 1447(d) provides that an order of remand is not
reviewable by "appeal or otherwise," including mandamus. 290 By contrast,
an order denying a motion to remand is eligible for review upon final
judgment and earlier upon petition for extraordinary writ.29' This means
that the district courts have nothing to lose upon granting a motion to
remand. At the very least, if it is unclear to the federal court that the
removing defendant has met its heavy burden to show fraudulent joinder,
then Congress has erected a severe incentive to resolve the issue in favor
of remand. Again, the rationale is that the fraudulent joinder question,
which is at base a question of subject matter jurisdiction, should be
anything but a ticket to federal court. Rather, congressional intent,
292t
consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, presumes that
the state forum is the norm to hear the case, the federal forum the
exception.
Finally, consistent with the terms of the removal statutes, the federal
courts strictly construe the removal statutes.29 3 In many jurisdictions,
doubts about removal are resolved in favor of remand.294
Recent legislation, however, may suggest that congressional intent is
not so undivided. Consider for example, recent procedural reforms such
as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 295 and the Multiparty,
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002.296 Both acts have challenged
some of the shibboleths of removal jurisprudence, including the complete

289. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see, e.g., Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir.

2003).
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A plaintiff is entitled to petition for a writ of mandamus to the
federal court before final judgment, as authorized by the All Writs Act. See id. § 1651 (a). But the
"clear and indisputable" standard for granting such a writ is so high that this remedy is not a
realistic possibility for plaintiffs. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309
(1989). However, the same remedy is not even theoretically possible for defendants when the
plaintiff's motion to remand is granted.
292. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
293. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
294. See, e.g., Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26,29 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that
all doubts regarding removal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand).
295. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 118 Stat. 4 (2005).
296. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2005).
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diversity standard,297 and in the case of CAFA, the amount-in-controversy
requirement,298 and even the reviewability of remand orders.'"
However, these "reforms" increase diversity jurisdiction with one hand
while decreasing it with the other. Both acts contain substantial carve-outs
for cases in which the interests of a state are substantial to the extent of
enabling federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction.3"0 Second, these
acts of legislation merely address special types of litigation, such as class
actions and mass torts, rather than generic litigation, which remains
untouched and for which the state courts remain the favored forum,
especially when considering that the typical fraudulent joinder context is
not a class or mass action, but rather one in which an individual plaintiff,
or a small number of plaintiffs, is suing a nondiverse agent of a diverse
principal.
Finally, this legislation actually reforms only some of the more
egregious and obvious mechanisms by which plaintiffs could defeat
diversity in the past, particularly in the class action context. Before CAFA,
plaintiffs' attorneys could defeat diversity jurisdiction simply by naming
a class representative with the same state citizenship as that of any
defendant. In this respect, CAFA is much like another recent revision to
section 1332, which had previously calculated the state citizenship of a
decedent or infant on the basis of the representative, but which was revised
to ensure that plaintiffs did not simply name a representative with
convenient state citizenship to defeat diversity jurisdiction.3 '
Another indication that Congress may not favor a limited fraudulent
joinder doctrine concerns the supplemental jurisdiction statute. 0 2 Enacted
in 1990, this statute arguably increases federal civil jurisdiction by

297. Both acts have included a "minimal diversity" standard, making removal easier. See 28
U.S.C. § 1369 (a); Class Action Fairness Act § 5. Under this standard, removal is permitted if any
one plaintiff is diverse from any one defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(1).
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (stating that the amount in controversy sufficient for federal
jurisdiction is $5,000,000, and permitting claims to be aggregated among class members, thereby
overruling prior rule of aggregation in Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973)).
299. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (stating that "notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of
appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to
remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed").
300. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369(b)(1)-(2) (requiring that federal courts decline jurisdiction when
"the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of which the primary
defendants are also citizens" and when "the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws
of that State"); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4) (alternatively permitting the federal court to decline
jurisdiction when "greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed
plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the
action was originally filed," considering several factors, and requiring the federal court to decline
jurisdiction when similar equities are tipped more decisively in favor of state jurisdiction).
301. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
302. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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enabling the federal courts, when they possess original jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action, to adjudicate state-based claims that "form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III.' 303 However, the
statute explicitly provides that if the federal jurisdiction for the underlying
claim is founded on diversity, then the statute does not apply if the
diversity is destroyed because of joinder or intervention of parties under
Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 . 3' The statute is in place, among other reasons, to
increase judicial efficiency, such that cases should not be cumbersomely
bifurcated with the potential for inconsistent results and duplicative
litigation. However, the statute explicitly provides that when Article 1II
diversity conflicts with judicial efficiency, Article II diversity wins.3 °5
For Congress to reverse the great extent to which federal legislative
policy is tilted in favor of remand on removed cases in which the federal
court's subject matter jurisdiction is not clear, Congress would likely have
to challenge, for the generic case, one or more of the complete diversity
requirement, the amount-in-controversy requirement, or the
nonreviewability of remand orders. Then, too, Congress would likely be
forced to revise the removal statutes themselves, statutes that contain
numerous incentives for the federal courts to remand cases when diversity
jurisdiction is not clear.
C. Notice Pleading
The liberal notice pleading principles animating the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure militate in favor of a limited fraudulent joinder doctrine.
Under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff only needs to provide the defendant or
defendants with a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief' in the original complaint.3"6 This low barrier
is present simply to provide notice to the defendant sufficient to enable the
defendant to "frame a responsive pleading."3 7 Only in exceptional
circumstances, set forth in Rule 9(b), is the plaintiff required to plead with
specificity.30 8 Those circumstances include "all averments of fraud or

303. Id.
304. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
305. Id.
306. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain.., a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.").
307. See FED. R. Civ.P. 12(e) ("Motion for More Definite Statement") ("Ifa pleading to which
a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before
interposing a responsive pleading.").
308. See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) ("Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind") ("In all averments of
the circumstances
fraud or mistake,
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mistake," in which case "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity."30 9 These two provisions necessarily
make it difficult for the parties to achieve judgment on the pleadings or for
defendants to see a court grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The rules
contemplate a period for discovery before the court determines whether the
plaintiff's claims are without merit,3"' often upon a summary judgment
motion made by the defendant when the plaintiff bears the burden of proof
at trial.
In the fraudulent joinder context, this means that the plaintiff s claims
against the nondiverse defendant are presumed valid. To be consistent with
the principles of the federal rules, the court should agree with the
removing defendant only if the plaintiff has pled a cause of action under
which the plaintiff could simply not recover because of clear and settled
state law. As a result, even exceedingly brief factual allegations should be
sufficient to enable the federal district court to grant the motion to remand
if the defendant cannot carry its heavy burden to show that the plaintiff has
no possibility of recovery against the nondiverse defendant that would
create federal jurisdiction.
However, the reality of 12(b)(6) motions practice is likely at odds with
the plaintiff-friendly theory of 12(b)(6) motions practice. Federal courts
have found ways around Rule 8(a) to require heightened pleading under
other circumstances, particularly in civil rights claims.3 ' The effect of
such heightened pleading is to increase the pre-trial rush to judgment3"2
even before discovery has occurred, because individual, as opposed to
state and municipal, defendants are frequently granted motions to dismiss
based on the insufficiency of the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6).3 13
The climate of heightened pleading is consistent with an expanded
fraudulent joinder doctrine because the plaintiff's complaint maybe tested
strenuously, after removal, in such a way that liberal notice pleading
standards are abandoned in favor of the perceived need to filter out
apparently frivolous claims. This problem is one great risk of utilizing

Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.").
309. Id.
310. See Fairman, supra note 26, at 993 (noting that discovery placed a less onerous burden
on pleadings practice and enabled frivolous claims to be expunged upon summary judgment).
311. See id.at 995 (stating that "unwarranted judicial concern over the rise in frivolous civil
rights litigation led the federal courts to require heightened pleading").
312. See Miller, supra note 114, at 1001 ("Congress specifically intended the PSLRA to
encourage the summary disposition of meritless claims by imposing substantially heightened
pleading requirements and restraining discovery until the motions to dismiss are decided.").
313. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,81 TEx. L. REV. 551, 568 (2002)
(noting that the Fifth Circuit applies a heightened pleading standard for individual defendants in
section 1983 actions) (citing Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985)).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/4
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both the "arguably reasonable basis" standard along with the 12(b)(6)
approach to determine whether the plaintiff has a possibility of recovery
against the nondiverse defendant. Proceeding in this fashion, the federal
court places too much emphasis on the plaintiff's pleadings at the expense
of recognizing the fact that the defendant bears a heavy burden to show
why federal jurisdiction is proper.
If the plaintiffs pleadings do not provide notice to the nondiverse
defendant, because of scant factual allegations for instance, it does not
necessarily mean that there is fraudulent joinder. Of course, plaintiffs who
move to remand while resting on scant factual allegations will make it
easier for defendants to carry their heavy burden, but any doubts regarding
the plaintiffs claims should be resolved in favor of remand, as many
courts hold.3 14 Factual matters in general should not be litigated at this
threshold level. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's claims are all legally
insufficient based on clear state law, whatever the factual allegations, then
there is fraudulent joinder. However, these situations are probably less
common than one might think. Furthermore, if the district court must
undertake an intricate analysis of state law to determine whether the
plaintiff s claims are all legally sufficient, then the matter belongs in state
court, given the federalism problems that could ensue.315
Finally, the principle that the plaintiff is "master of the complaint," as
reflected in Rule 19 jurisprudence,316 supports a limited fraudulent joinder
doctrine. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a plaintiff need not
join all potential tortfeasors in the same action in the face of a defendant's
Rule 19 challenge, which has the effect of enabling plaintiffs to avoid the
federal forum if they choose, under certain circumstances.31 7
In Temple v. Synthes, the plaintiff had been injured during surgery
when a plate that had been installed in his lower back had broken down.318
The plaintiff sued the product manufacturer in federal court, while he
simultaneously pursued a disciplinary action against the doctor and
hospital in a Louisiana state administrative proceeding. 3 9 The defendant

314. See, e.g., Marshall v. Manville, 6 F.3d 229, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Baisden v.
Bayer Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 759, 762 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (stating that under Rule 8(a) and
"[u]nder notice pleading, it is not necessary that [the plaintiff] provide the factual basis for that
claim [of medical malpractice]") (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11
(2002)).
315. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 853 (3d Cir. 1992) ("A claim which can
be dismissed only after an intricate analysis of state law is not so wholly insubstantial and frivolous
that it may be disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.").
316. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 ("Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication").
317. See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., Ltd., 498 U.S. 5,7 (1990) (citing prior Supreme Court
case law).
318. Id. at5-6.
319. Id. at6.
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filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of Rule 19, and the district court
granted the motion, dismissing the action with prejudice because of the
plaintiff's failure tojoin the doctor and hospital in the federal suit.32° While
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, allowing plaintiffs
to refuse to join all potential tortfeasors in the same action, which under
these circumstances, enabled the plaintiff to create federal jurisdiction.32
As a result, notwithstanding Rule 19-not to mention section 13 59-if the
Supreme Court permits plaintiffs the latitude to refuse to join potential
tortfeasors in an action sufficient to create federal jurisdiction, then it is all
the more permissible for plaintiffs to shape their complaints to avoid the
federal forum.
D. Articles III and VI of the Constitution
The Constitution conceives the federal and state courts differently, and
these conceptions argue in favor of a limited fraudulent joinder doctrine.
Article HI of the Constitution provides for the existence of federal courts
limited in power both by subject matter and by Congress.322 Article VI
recognizes that state courts will be the default dispensers of law by
requiring that state courts apply federal law.323 Finally, the Tenth
Amendment explicitly reserves to the states and the people "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution."324 The sum of these
provisions has given rise to the twin-sided axiom that the federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and the state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction.325
These constitutional provisions also argue in favor of a limited
fraudulent joinder doctrine. In essence, if the district court were to expand
its role and discretion in deciding the fraudulent joinder issue, it would be
upsetting the delicate balance between state and federal power rooted in
the Constitution. Consistent with this balance, federal courts are charged
with an ongoing duty to inquire into the basis of their jurisdiction over the
subject matter presented to them for adjudication.326 Defects in that

320. Id.
321. Id. at 7.
322. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
323. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
324. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
325. See, e.g., Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d
432, 435 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "state courts are courts of general jurisdiction and are
accordingly presumed to have jurisdiction over federally-created causes of action unless Congress
indicates otherwise, whereas federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction which thus require a
specific grant of jurisdiction") (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441,449 (1850)).
326. See, e.g., Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 1998)
("[F]ederal courts have a continuing obligation to inquire into the basis of subject-matter
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jurisdiction trigger state court jurisdiction, almost without exception.327
Otherwise, the federal court's adjudication of a matter over which it does
not possess jurisdiction amounts to an "unconstitutional invasion" into the
state courts.328 By contrast, an expansive fraudulent joinder doctrine risks
violating the constitutional role of the federal courts by encouraging the
district courts to review matters beyond their own subject matter
jurisdiction before they even determine that they have subject matter
jurisdiction. 29
The various abstention doctrines that the federal courts may apply
support further the importance of the role of federalism in the fraudulent
joinder question, particularly abstention as in Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Thibodaux.33 ' As a general rule, if a matter presented in the federal
forum would tread too much upon state jurisdiction, the federal court will
abstain from hearing the case, even though it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case or controversy.33 ' In particular, federal courts are
empowered to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction when state law is
unclear.332
The issue in fraudulent joinder is whether the federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy. However, the fact that
abstention doctrines exist militates against an expanded fraudulent joinder
doctrine because there are cases or controversies over which the federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction but which will not be heard in a
federal forum because of state prerogative, particularly when state law is
unclear, as the rule of Thibodaux indicates.333 Consequently, federal courts
should be even more reluctant to find that they have subject matter
jurisdiction over a case or controversy when the nondiverse defendant is
arguably joined fraudulently, especially when state law that would apply
to the plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant is unclear.
Of course, the Constitution does confer upon the federal courts the right
to hear cases or controversies founded on diversity jurisdiction, 334 and thus

jurisdiction to satisfy themselves that jurisdiction to entertain an action exists.").
327. But see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 103-04 (1941).
328. See 20 WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 28, § 8 (pointing out that when a federal court does
not remand a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, the refusal to remand is "not
simply wrong" but rather amounts to an "unconstitutional invasion").
329. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998).
330. See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (holding that
federal courts should decline to exercise diversity jurisdiction when an action is "intimately
involved with sovereign prerogative").
331. See id.
332. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941) (declining
jurisdiction over equity matter in absence of determination made by state's highest court).
333. See Thobudaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
334. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cf. 1.
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some have argued or asserted that the defendant's right to remove is
grounded in the Constitution rather than in the removal statutes. 335 The
argument runs in such a way that, because the Constitution permits federal
courts to hear cases and controversies between citizens of different states,
then the removal statutes are necessary to effectuate that grant ofjudicial
power (provided of course that Congress has created federal courts in the
first place). In support of this argument, examples from federal court
practice in the century after the Judiciary Act of 1789, which contained the
first removal legislation, indicate that federal courts perceived the federal
right of removal as constitutionally grounded. 36
However, the argument effectively constitutionalizes the removal
statutes by treating them as the transparent mechanism by which the
constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts is made
functional. But the plain language of the constitution says nothing of a
defendant's right to the federal forum. Furthermore, the constitutional
grant is free-standing and, in the absence of removal statutes, would
simply apply when plaintiffs originally brought suit in the federal forum.
Those who believe that removal is a constitutional right must ultimately
face the counter-argument that the Supreme Court would not strike down
removal legislation because of Congress's power over the federal courts,
excepting the remote possibility that Congress denied absolutely the right
of any party to the federal forum based on diversity jurisdiction. Because
Congress has plenary power over the federal courts subject only to slight
constitutional restrictions, its removal statutes truly ground the defendant's
right of removal.
E. JudicialEconomy
A policy favoring judicial economy militates in favor of a limited
fraudulent joinder doctrine, albeit not to the extent that the other federal
policies do because an expansive fraudulentjoinder may permit the benefit
of filtering out some frivolous claims. However, such filtering does not
335. See Haiber, supra note 24, at 612-13 (stating that during most of the nineteenth century
federal courts viewed a defendant's right of removal as constitutionally based and no less important
than the plaintiff's right to choose the forum).
336. Seeid. at618.
The constitution of the United States was designed for the common and equal
benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial power was granted for
the same benign and salutary purposes. It was not to be exercised exclusively for
the benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national forum,
but also for the protection of defendants who might be entitled to try their rights,
or assert their privileges, before the same forum.
Id. (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 348 (1816)).
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dispose of the action. It merely determines that the federal court, and not
the state court, will hear the matter, and the state courts can likely resolve
the litigation more efficiently because those courts may have greater
familiarity with state law than does the federal district court, which may
be otherwise burdened by an extensive federal criminal docket.
Additionally, as already noted, a decision denying the motion to remand
may be appealed,337 which creates, rather than dispels, inefficiency; by
contrast, an order granting a motion to remand may not be appealed,338
which does dispel inefficiency.
Furthermore, because the fraudulent joinder question is essentially a
jurisdictional question, extensive judicial resources should not be allocated
to such discrete and narrow questions. The Supreme Court has weighed in
on this question with dicta, such that litigation over which court will hear
' On the other hand,
a matter is a "'waste of time and resources."339
"[j]urisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing.""34 Likewise, the
Court has cited the American Law Institute's 1968 study on the division
between the state and federal courts to the effect that "' [i]t is of first
importance to have a definition . . . [that] will not invite extensive
threshold litigation over jurisdiction.""'34 Judicial resources are simply
much too scarce to be allocated extensively to such narrow matters.
If there is any doubt as to whether the matter should be heard in federal
court, then the case can simply be remanded without further ado. As one
court has put it, deciding a motion to remand is simply "direct[ing] judicial
'
traffic,"342
and in directing such traffic, it is implied that courts need not
deeply consider the fraudulent joinder question because the removal
statutes, the Federal Rules, and the Constitution have already made most
of the tough decisions. Why should a federal district court add unnecessary
difficulty and complication to what should be a simple question?
Further, such resources should be reserved to serve better the systemic
values for which the courts are designed, especially for deciding cases on
the merits and permitting plaintiffs their day in court.343 However,
efficiency, also a systemic value of the court system, has risen in perceived
importance among other systemic values to the extent that an expansive
fraudulent joinder becomes more attractive to courts. To this end, filtering
337. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (noting
that ordinarily a denial of a motion to remand is not an appealable final order under section 129 1).
338. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2005).
339. Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458,464 n. 13 (1980) (quoting David P. Currie, The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, PartI, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968)).
340. Currie, supranote 339, at 1.
341. Navarro,446 U.S. at464 n. 13 (omission in original) (quoting AMERICANLAWINSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIvIsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 128 (1969)).
342. Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999).
343. See Miller, supra note 114, at 1003.
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out apparently frivolous claims appears to serve the systemic value of
resolving disputes efficiently. However, in the fraudulent joinder context,
doing so creates other inefficiencies because disputes are not necessarily
resolved any more efficiently after the nondiverse defendant is dismissed.
F. Toward a Better Model of FraudulentJoinder
A better fraudulent joinder doctrine resolves the circuit splits to be as
consistent as possible with the classic policy underpinnings of the doctrine,
as detailed in the foregoing subsections of this Part. Thus, a better
fraudulent joinder doctrine includes (1) a limited scope of inquiry that may
or may not justify piercing the pleadings, and if so, with special
precautions, (2) a flat statement regarding the plaintiffs possibility of
recovery that emphasizes the defendant's great burden to prove fraudulent
joinder, and finally (3) an exclusion of any reference to the 12(b)(6)
standard, stressing the essentially jurisdictional issue before the court.
1. Narrow the Scope of Inquiry
The federal district courts should be permitted to "pierce the pleadings"
to determine whether fraudulent joinder exists, for both the normative
reason that federal courts are charged with a continuing duty of inquiring
into the basis for their own jurisdiction over the subject matter before
them, and the practical reason that pleading can hide jurisdictional
realities. Normatively, there is authority indicating that these courts have
the inherent power to do so.3" Additionally, a rule prohibiting the federal
courts from piercing would be improvident and unfair. While deciding the
fraudulent joinder issue purely on the basis of the pleadings would have
the virtue of conserving scarce judicial resources, applying this rule would
be inappropriate even if the plaintiff had simply not stated a cause of
action against the nondiverse defendant. Such a rule would prohibit the
plaintiff from introducing extrinsic evidence that could further substantiate
why the plaintiff chose to join the nondiverse defendant, even when that
evidence would not exceed the limits of the complaint's factual allegations
and stated grounds for recovery against the nondiverse defendant. Then,
too, the rule would be unfair to defendants because it would prevent
defendants from introducing purely jurisdictional facts into the court's
inquiry that could save the time and trouble of discovery against a party
who truly has no connection with the controversy.
However, the risk of excessive piercing, especially in the Fifth Circuit
where the district courts are nearly compelled to pierce,"' is too great

344. See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 178 (1907).
345. But see supranote 114.
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without some important guiding principles that must be considered. First,
and most basic, the ability of the district courts to review summary
judgment-type evidence should not lead the court to apply a summary
judgment-type standard to that evidence, and indeed it should not pre-try
the case on the merits. Second, and nearly as basic, this ability should not
enable the district court to forget that the burden of proof to show
fraudulent joinder rests on the defendant, without ever shifting, and that
this burden is a heavy one.
With excessive piercing, the district court becomes familiar enough
with the merits of the plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendants
to the extent that pre-trying those claims becomes tempting.346 The district
court must separate jurisdictional facts from merits-based facts, despite
that the line separating the two may not be clear. But even when the two
are not easily separated, the district court should take into account only the
purely jurisdictional facts. To do otherwise would be to base the decision
of whether to remand on an improper, unconstitutional basis, thereby
violating the jurisdiction of the state courts and the plaintiffs right to see
its case decided on the merits. If there are doubts about resolving the
fraudulent joinder question, and there will often be such doubts given the
uncertain status of facts and law at such an early stage in the litigation,
courts could reasonably decide that doubts favor remand, as some courts
have already held. 7
Consistent with what Professor Arthur Miller has termed a "culture of
management" in civil litigation, in which district courts aggressively
manage pre-trial matters that consequently emboldens pretrial
disposition,34 defendants crying fraudulent joinder can flood the district
court with summary judgment evidence that incorporates both
jurisdictional and merits-oriented facts to blur the distinction between the
two. The court then becomes familiar enough with the merits of the
plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse defendant to risk deciding the
jurisdictional question of fraudulent joinder on an improper basis, by pretrying the claims. Even worse, a decision denying a plaintiff's motion to
remand on this unconstitutional basis may also serve to educate the diverse

346. See Miller, supra note 114, at 1070.
347. See, e.g., Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806,811 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that when
"the sufficiency of the complaint against the nondiverse defendant is questionable, 'the better
practice is for the federal court not to decide the doubtful question in connection with a motion to
remand but simply to remand the case and leave the question for the state courts to decide"')
(quoting Iowa Public Serv. Co. v. Medicine Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1977));
Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that, when interpreting
the removal statutes, the statutes should be strictly construed "and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of remand").
348. See Miller, supra note 114, at 1071.
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defendants on the judge's view of the merits of the plaintiff's claims
against them, further compromising the interests of plaintiffs.
2. Avoid Fuss Over the "No Possibility" Standard
Second, the "no possibility of recovery" language should be construed
literally without further interpretation, interpretation that would translate
the standard either into the question of whether the plaintiff has "arguably
' for recovery against the nondiverse defendant, or
a reasonable basis"349
whether the plaintiff has a mere "glimmer of hope"35 of recovery against
the defendant, among other possibilities. To avoid such interpretation is to
underscore the heavy burden of proof that rests on the defendant's
shoulders to prove fraudulent joinder, a burden well-recognized in the
federal courts and one that has constitutional underpinnings.
When a court translates the plaintiff's possibility of recovery into other
language, the court at best muddies the waters of the fraudulent joinder
analysis, waters already muddy enough due to the improper focus of
attention on the plaintiff when it is the defendant upon whom the heavy
burden of establishing fraudulent joinder rests. At worst, the court
unwarrantedly expands federal judicial discretion to pre-try the case
against the nondiverse defendants by imposing upon the plaintiffs a
"reasonableness" standard. Despite the Travis panel's argument to the
contrary, 351 a reasonableness standard does differ from the "absolutely no
possibility" standard by implicitly focusing the court's attention on the
plaintiff's preparation and investigation in developing the pleadings, rather
than whether the claim itself could potentially generate recovery not to
mention the defendants' heavy burden. The fact that further definition of
this standard has preoccupied courts, as opposed to the federal policies that
drive the fraudulent joinder question that lean heavily in favor of remand
and against defendants, is itself a further testament to the reality that the
fraudulent joinder doctrine could spin out of control, particularly in the
leading jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit, which employs both the widest
piercing standard and the reasonable basis standard for plaintiff's
possibility of recovery.
3. Drop the 12(b)(6) Approach
Finally, to the extent that the federal courts need a rule-based analogy
to educate litigants and the public about how the fraudulent joinder

349. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original).
350. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[T]here need be
only a slight possibility of a right to relief. Once the court identifies this glimmer of hope for the
plaintiff, the jurisdictional inquiry ends.") (citation omitted).
351. See Travis, 326 F.3d at 648.
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doctrine functions, then the proper analogy is Rule 12(b)(1)35 2 and not
12(b)(6).353 An order granting a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) is a decision that the plaintiffs claim either does not provide
proper notice to the defendant or is legally insufficient for a court to award
recovery based on the allegations in the complaint taken as true.354 By
contrast, the fraudulentjoinder inquiry simply determines which court will
hear the case.355
Additionally, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is decided on the pleadings
without extrinsic evidence, while a 12(b)(1) motion enables a court to
consider extrinsic evidence, which is furtherjustification for permitting the
district court to engage in a limited piercing of the pleadings.356 Finally,
even if the plaintiff survives the fraudulent joinder analysis, the plaintiff
may later have the claim against the nondiverse defendant dismissed under
the state court equivalent to the 12(b)(6) motion.357 Such a result should
not generate any inconsistency under the fraudulent joinder analysis when
the plaintiff sees its motion to remand granted. This possibility is further
cause to imagine the fraudulent joinder inquiry as separate from the
analysis under 12(b)(6).358
Commitment to the 12(b)(6) standard, or even use of its language
regarding whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action against the
nondiverse defendant, is confusing and misleading in the fraudulent
joinder context. The 12(b)(6) aspects of the fraudulentjoinder inquiry can
be scrapped without injuring the doctrine because their very presence
injures it. The injury occurs through the excessive complexity that the
12(b)(6) standard generates when incorporated into the fraudulent joinder
doctrine, complexity that increases judicial discretion over a narrow
jurisdictional issue and improperly benefits defendants over plaintiffs.
That the 12(b)(6) standard is, in theory, friendly to plaintiffs militates
352. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
353. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
354. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957).
355. Although, of course, the plaintiffgenerally bears the burden ofproof under 12(b)(1), this
is merely because the plaintiff is invoking federal jurisdiction, and it is always the party invoking
federal jurisdiction who bears the burden of showing why federal jurisdiction is proper. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993). In the fraudulent joinder
context, that party is the defendant.
356. See, e.g., City of Arcadia v. United States EPA, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151 (D.C. Cal.
2003).
357. See Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
358. Another cause is the fact that leave to amend may be granted to plaintiffs in the 12(b)(6)
context, if the plaintiff's claims are insufficient in some way. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 28, § 1357. However, this is often not permissible in the fraudulent joinder situation, based
on the longstanding rule that post-removal amendments to the plaintiff's complaint are not
considered when the court decides whether to remand the action because of fraudulent joinder. See
Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939).
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against this result. But the complexity of importing the standard retards the
district court's ability to see clearly the narrow issues before it, not least
because the 12(b)(6) standard, in reality, has become much less friendly
to plaintiffs than originally conceived, especially in light of greater case
management by judges and increasing use of summary disposition since
the mid- 1980s.35 9
In the end, because the fraudulent joinder issue is ajurisdictional issue,
if the district court improperly engages in an analysis of the merits of the
plaintiffs claims against the nondiverse defendant, however slight, then
the nondiverse defendant will either be dismissed from the case, or will be
entitled to make the same argument to the state courts upon remand,
getting "two bites of the apple.""36 As a result of such impropriety, the
diverse defendant also stands to benefit if the motion to remand is denied
because the court's analysis of the plaintiff's claims against the nondiverse
defendant could apply with equal force to the plaintiff's claims against the
diverse defendants.
V. CONCLUSION

The fraudulent joinder question is not merely a procedural issue
without significant bearing on the substantive rights of private parties or
on the different branches of government. Courts and litigants know better.
Of course, the merits of the claim, and not the characteristics of the forum,
should determine outcomes. However, plaintiff success rates for removed
cases are so low (at roughly 34%)361 that the parties have much to gain or
lose depending on whether the district court will grant the plaintiffs
motion to remand. At the very least, the parties' respective postures for
settlement negotiations are dramatically altered if the motion to remand is

359. SeeMiller, supranote 114, at 1011.
360. See Hunt v. Ring, 946 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (noting that federal judges
face a "[c]atch-22" when deciding issues of fraudulent joinder:
[I]n determining our own jurisdiction, we must resolve a substantive question of
law which may remove that very jurisdiction. This process gives a non-diverse
defendant two bites of the apple, since first he has the benefit of federal court
examination of the state law issue (which may be outside federal jurisdiction), and
if the federal court finds in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant can make the same
argument after remand to state court. While I adhere to the command of the
above-cited cases, I continue to believe that any facially valid claim against a
non-diverse party should be remanded to state court.).
But see Haiber, supra note 24, at 641-55 (detailing a list of maneuvers plaintiffs have at their
disposal to insure that cases remain in state court).
361. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 581.
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denied, when plaintiffs may suddenly find themselves with a weak case for
recovery.
Currently there is considerable confusion and doubt regarding the
applicable standard to be used to decide the fraudulent joinder question
and how that standard is to be applied. Moreover, the policy concerns that
ought to animate the doctrine, whether derived from the removal statutes
or the Federal Rules, the Constitution or judicial economy, argue in favor
of a more limited fraudulent joinder than that which currently presides in
many circuits. The policy concerns argue in favor of viewing fraudulent
joinder as an essentially jurisdictional issue, and that it is inappropriate to
use a 12(b)(6) standard, as the leading circuit does. They argue against
interpolation of the "no possibility" language, thus keeping in view the
removing defendant's heavy burden. Finally, they hinder the possibility
that the district courts will embark on a "safari in search of ajudgment on
the merits ' 3 62 by preventing the district courts from "piercing the
pleadings" without limits or methodology.
The current cultural mood regarding civil litigation likely has much to
say about why the fraudulent joinder doctrine has become such a contested
and complex site for litigation. The perceived need to filter out apparently
frivolous claims before trial is at play in a complex and more defendantfriendly fraudulent joinder doctrine, like that which presides in the Fifth
Circuit. However, the irony of this approach is that it increases the size of
the federal docket. When coupled with an ever-expanding federal criminal
docket, this likely means increased delay--delay that expressly benefits
defendants over plaintiffs. On the other hand, granting a motion to remand
shrinks the federal civil docket, not simply because the case goes to state
court, but also because the decision to grant the motion to remand is
unreviewable as a matter of federal statute. Congress cannot be blamed
here for increasing the workload of federal judges. Congress has left the
federal district courts with an easy way out: granting the motion to remand
unless all factors clearly point the other way.
The reasons that federal courts are not taking the easy way out are
largely a matter of speculation. However, as Professor Miller has
persuasively argued, the ever-increasing role that the "culture of
management" plays in pre-trial civil litigation, both in the state and federal
courts, is probably a good explanation.363 In practice, the fraudulentjoinder
question permits judges to become more familiar with the underlying facts
of cases. With familiarity of the underlying facts comes an even greater

362. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981)
("Thus, the trial court must be certain of its jurisdiction before embarking upon a safari in search
of a judgment on the merits.").
at 1071. 2006
supra note 114,
363. bySee
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perceived ability in federal judges to dispose of the issue on the merits,
despite that little or no actual discovery has occurred, let alone trial.3"
Manipulating the fraudulent joinder analysis in this way is no doubt a
form ofjudicial activism in a sense foreign to that term's common usage.
However, such manipulation should be recognized as a pejorative form of
judicial activism because an expanded fraudulent joinder doctrine evinces
political commitments in favor of corporate defendants and against
plaintiff individuals. An expanded fraudulent joinder doctrine is thus
consistent with the way in which certain procedural reforms, like those in
the arena of tort reform, have a substantive and political effect.
' is what must be
A "safari in search of judgment on the merits"365
avoided, but so must opportunities for plaintiffs to game rules and subvert
the purposes of the removal statutes, however much those statutes are to
be strictly construed. The best way to accomplish these goals, in light of
current case law, is to limit the fraudulent joinder inquiry to a
jurisdictional basis without importing the baggage of the motion to dismiss
standard under Rule 12(b)(6).
Finally, while some piercing of the pleadings might be necessary in the
fraudulent joinder question, such piercing should be limited in scope. The
plaintiff's grounds for recovery against the nondiverse defendants should
not be in issue unless the removing defendant can show either that state
law affirmatively precludes the plaintiff from recovery against the
nondiverse defendant under the facts alleged, or that the facts the
defendant submits, which cannot involve the merits, show conclusively,
without real dispute from the plaintiff, that the plaintiff could not possibly
recover against the nondiverse defendant. All other cases should be
remanded. In this way, the federal courts can remain true to the policy
considerations that determine the doctrine and its application, such that
'
litigation over jurisdiction really is "as self-regulated as breathing."366

364. See id. (stating that, among other things, a "culture of management... gives the judge
a sense of familiarity with the dispute that emboldens pretrial disposition").
365. Miller Brewing, 663 F.2d at 548-49.
366. See Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458,464 n. 13 (1980) (noting that "[j]urisdiction
should be as self-regulated as breathing; ... litigation over whether the case is in the right court is
essentially a waste of time and resources") (quoting David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the
American Law Institute, Part 1, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968)).
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